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Abstract 
We use variation in oil output among Brazilian municipalities to investigate the effects of resource 
windfalls. We find muted effects of oil through market channels: offshore oil has no effect on 
municipal non-oil GDP or its composition, while onshore oil has only modest effects on non-oil GDP 
composition. However, oil abundance causes municipal revenues and reported spending on a range of 
budgetary items to increase, mainly as a result of royalties paid by Petrobras. Nevertheless, survey-
based measures of social transfers, public good provision, infrastructure, and household income 
increase less (if at all) than one might expect given the increase in reported spending. To explain why 
oil windfalls contribute little to local living standards, we use data from the Brazilian media and 
federal police to document that very large oil output increases alleged instances of illegal activities 
associated with mayors. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Should communities that discover oil in their subsoil or off their coast, rejoice or mourn? Should 
citizens be thrilled or worried when their governments receive fiscal windfalls? Ample anecdotal 
evidence on both questions has, over the years, shaken many economists’ confidence that the 
answer is as obvious (rejoice, of course) as it might seem at first brush. Oil, like many other 
natural resources, is increasingly suspected of being a “curse,” bringing Dutch Disease, 
corruption, rent seeking, and other ills that result in the dissipation of most possible benefits – if 
not in extreme cases in an outright decline in living standards. Fiscal windfalls, such as 
international aid or – in the case of local government – transfers from the central government, 
also stand often accused of creating a similar set of problems. And when oil abundance generates 
royalties for the government there is scope for a potentially particularly lethal mix where all the 
problems allegedly intrinsic to resource abundance are compounded by those thought to be 
associated with the fiscal windfall. 
 
Brazilian municipalities offer an interesting testing ground for these conjectures. Oil 
endowments, and hence production, vary widely among them, and we argue that conditional on a 
few geographic controls this variation is exogenous to municipal characteristics. Hence, we can 
ask whether oil has positive or negative spillovers on other market activities. Furthermore, oil-
producing municipalities are entitled to royalties, so we can investigate the consequences of an 
oil-related fiscal windfall. 
 
We begin by investigating the effects of oil through market spillovers, and find that these are 
small. In particular, in the cross-section of Brazilian municipalities one Real of extra value added 
from oil translates into roughly one Real of aggregate GDP, indicating that to a first 
approximation oil production has no spillovers (either negative or positive) on non-oil activities. 
We do find some small changes in the composition of non-oil GDP when the oil is located 
onshore (manufacturing shrinks and services expand), but not when it is offshore. 
 
We next turn to the fiscal windfall. We confirm that municipal revenues increase significantly 
with oil production, and that the bulk of this increase is accounted for by royalties. Evidently, 
royalty payments are not undone by offsetting changes in other transfers from the state or federal 
governments (or by tax cuts). The revenue-side expansion is matched by a corresponding 
increase in the expenditure-side of the budget. Municipalities that receive oil windfalls report 
significant increases in spending on a variety of public goods and services, such as housing and 
urban infrastructure, education, health, and transportation, and in transfers to households. 
  
Given the significant expansion in reported spending, one would expect sizable improvements in 
welfare-relevant outcomes for the local population. We therefore look at measures of housing 
quality and quantity, supply of educational and health inputs, road infrastructure, and welfare 
receipts. The results paint a complex picture, with no apparent changes in some areas, small 
improvements in some others, and small worsening in others yet. On balance, however, the data 
appear to suggest that the actual flow of goods, services, and transfers to the population is not 
quite commensurate to the reported spending increases stemming from the windfall, a shortfall 
that we dub “missing money.” To confirm that the windfall does not trickle down to the 
population through other channels we look at household income, and find only minimal 
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improvements. We also show that oil-rich municipalities did not experience a differential 
increase in population. This implies that our results are not driven by a dilution of the benefits of 
oil abundance. Furthermore, the fact that people do not flock to oil-abundant communities 
reinforces our message that oil abundance has not been seen as particularly beneficial by the 
population. 
 
Our finding that oil windfalls translate into little improvement in the provision of public goods or 
the population’s living standards raises an important question: where are the oil revenues going? 
To partly address this question we put together a few pieces of tentative evidence. First, oil 
revenues increase the size of municipal workers’ houses (but not the size of other residents’ 
houses). Second, Brazil’s news agency is more likely to carry news items mentioning corruption 
and the mayor in municipalities with very high levels of oil output (on an absolute, though not 
per capita, basis). Third, federal police operations are more likely to occur in municipalities with 
very high levels of oil output (again in absolute terms). And finally, we document anecdotal 
evidence of scandals involving mayors in several of the largest oil producing municipalities, 
some of which involve large sums of money. To partly explain why senior municipal workers 
may have thought that they could “get away” with large-scale alleged theft in a country where 
local elections are held regularly, we note that a survey in the largest oil producing municipality 
found considerable ignorance among residents regarding the scale of the municipal oil windfall.  
 
There is a growing empirical literature attempting to provide systematic statistical evidence on 
the effects of resource abundance. The near totality of this work focuses on inter-country 
comparisons. Using cross-sectional or panel techniques it typically presents regressions of per-
capita growth on proxies for resource abundance. While useful, these exercises have some 
limitations. Different countries are characterized by very different institutional and cultural 
features, which may well correlate with resource abundance. Only some of these can be 
controlled for with available data. Another possible problem is that resource abundance tends to 
be measured by flows of natural-resource exports (often normalized by GDP, or total exports), 
which could be argued to be an outcome variable in its own right – and hence not exogenous. 
Data quality is also a perennial concern in cross-country work, as is the fact that intrinsic 
limitations in the available variables prevent many of these studies from identifying the specific 
mechanisms through which resource abundance affects outcomes. Very similar limitations could 
be ascribed to the budding literature using cross-country data to investigate the effects of fiscal 
windfalls, particularly international aid. 2 
 
Because we use variation within Brazilian states many of the institutional, cultural, and policy 
variables that confound the cross-country relationship between resources (and aid) and 
macroeconomic outcomes are held constant, enhancing our ability to make inference. In 
addition, as we detail below, we can make plausible claims of exogeneity for our measure of 
resource abundance. Finally, we can say more about the channels of causation. In particular, we 
can distinguish between the effects of oil abundance operating through the market, and those 
                                                 
2 The “classic” cross-country study on the effect of natural resources is Sachs and Warner (1997). Other 
contributions in this vein include Leite and Weidmann (1999), Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett and Busby (2005), 
Kolstad (2007), Collier and Goderis (2007), and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). On foreign aid examples include 
Alesina and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Weder (2002), Tavares (2003), Easterly (2006), and Rajan and Subramanian 
(2008). 
3
 
 
operating through the (local) government. Furthermore, thanks to the richness of the set of 
variables we observe, we can shed an unusual amount of light on the way municipal 
governments spend their oil revenues and on the effects of such spending on welfare-relevant 
outcomes. 
 
There are of course disadvantages to moving from the cross-country to a within-country setting. 
What may be true for Brazil might not generalize to other countries. In addition, we only capture 
the differential effect of oil between oil-rich and oil-poor municipalities, but any aggregate effect 
oil may have in the country as a whole would not be detected by our analysis.3 Most importantly, 
there are a number of prominent explanations for the “resource curse” that only operate at the 
national level. For example, some “Dutch Disease” mechanisms work through (or are amplified 
by) the nominal exchange rate, and would therefore not show up across municipalities. Similarly, 
our analysis cannot test the hypothesis that resource abundance is a cause of political violence 
and civil war. As we discuss in a final section of the paper, this still leaves many (to be precise, 
at least seven) other theoretically interesting mechanisms that could operate at the local level. 
But the irreducibly country-wide nature of some of the conjectured resource-curse channels 
means that our work is a complement, and not a substitute, for cross-country analysis.4 As a 
testing ground for the effects of fiscal windfalls in general, as opposed to from royalties in 
particular, the limitation of our study is that fiscal windfalls from oil may have different 
consequences from fiscal windfalls from, say, foreign aid, so again caution is needed in 
generalizing the results. We return to this point at the end of the paper. 5 
 
A few recent studies have tried, like ours, to move beyond the cross-country correlations and 
examine resource discoveries using within-country regional variation.6 Michaels (2008) finds 
substantial local benefits from oil in the US South, at least for a considerable period of time. This 
underscores the limitations of extrapolating our Brazilian results, as discussed above. Naritomi, 
Soares, and Assuncao (2007) single out Brazilian municipalities that were historically associated 
with sugar-cane production or gold extraction during the colonial period, and find that today they 
are worse governed, more unequal, and poorer. Bobonis (2008) studies elite behavior in respect 
to labor practices and education policies in 19th century Puerto Rico as a function of various 
regions’ suitability for coffee production. Vicente (2008) compares changes in perceived 
corruption in Sao Tome (which recently found oil) with Cape Verde (which didn’t), and finds 
large increases in corruption following the oil discovery.7 On fiscal windfalls, the closest 
                                                 
3 Given the relatively small size of the oil sector for Brazil as a whole, however, we do not expect this loss to be first 
order. 
4 Of the theoretical mechanisms potentially observable at the local level only two have predictions that are wholly 
consistent with out findings: (onshore) resource abundance changes the composition of non-resource economic 
activities, in response to demand for business and personal services by oil operations (an effect operating through 
the market); and: (ii) resource revenue is easier to embezzle than non-resource revenue, leading to an increase in 
corruption following resource windfalls (a political-economy effect). 
5 See Dalgaard and Olsson (2008) for some circumstantial cross-country evidence that resource rents are more 
conducive to corruption than aid. 
6 Aragon and Rud (2009) have recently gone further and exploited variation among households, using distance from 
the Yanacocha mine in Peru as the source of variation. 
7 Recently Monteiro and Ferraz (2009) have studied the effects of oil royalties on political outcomes (campaign 
contributions, electoral competition, quality of politicians) in Brazilian municipalities. Their contribution is highly 
complementary to ours. There is also a small literature in Portuguese investigating some differences in outcomes 
between municipalities according to the oil royalties they receive. Postali (2008) regresses the change in the 
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contribution is Litschig’s (2008) study of federal transfers to Brazilian municipalities, exploiting 
discontinuities in the transfer-allocation rule. He finds that these windfalls translate into 
increased educational spending and gains in schooling. Also related is the discovery by Reinikka 
and Svensson (2004) that the vast majority of public funds due to Ugandan primary schools 
never reach the intended recipients, which is reminiscent of our “missing money” result. Our 
“missing money” is also similar to Fisman and Wei’s (2004) “missing imports:” both are 
potential indirect measures of corrupt activities (in their case, tariff evasion).8 
 
II. Oil in Brazil: A Brief Overview 
 
Figure 1 presents a summary of the pace and timing of oil discoveries in Brazil. 9 Meaningful 
onshore oil discovery began in the 1940s, and the number of finds reached a peak in the 1980s. 
Successful onshore prospecting activity has since dwindled. Offshore oil prospecting is a much 
more recent story, with finds growing very rapidly from almost nothing in the early 1970s, to a 
peak in the 1980s. Subsequently, there has been a marked decline in the 1990s, and a significant 
pick up in the 2000s – the latter not reflected in the figure because the big finds at Tupi and 
Carioca occurred very recently. For our purposes, the important take away from the figure is that 
offshore oil is for all practical purposes a post-1970 development. This is important because later 
on we show that in 1970 (subsequently) oil-rich municipalities looked indistinguishable from 
municipalities that did not discover oil later in the century (conditional on appropriate controls). 
 
As of 2005, the Brazilian oil sector accounted for approximately 2% of world oil production, 1% 
of world oil reserves, and 2% of Brazilian GDP. (All of these figures should rise significantly 
when Tupi and Carioca begin production.) Offshore oil accounts for the vast majority of output. 
For example, in 2002 offshore oil output was 1,200 million barrels per day on average, while 
onshore output was about 200 million barrels per day. The relative importance of offshore oil 
continues to rise steadily. 
 
Oil in Brazil is inextricably linked to Petrobras, the oil multinational. From 1953 to 1997 
Petrobras was a fully state-owned monopolist both in oil extraction and refining. Since 1997 the 
oil industry has been liberalized, and Petrobras partly privatized, though the federal government 
retains a minority but controlling stake. Despite the liberalization and the appearance of new 
players, Petrobras still completely dominates the industry. Given the essentially monopolistic 
structure of the industry, the oil sector is heavily regulated. Since 1997 the industry regulator is 
Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (ANP). One of the many 
important functions of ANP is to oversee the calculation of royalties due on each oilfield, collect 
                                                                                                                                                             
municipality growth rate of per capita GDP over the two sub-periods 1996-1999 and 2001-2004 on average total 
municipality revenue over the period 2000-2004, finding a negative coefficient. Other studies look at the correlation 
between royalty income and selected items of the spending budget or social indicators in selected sub-regions of the 
country [e.g. Leal and Serra (2002), Costa Nova (2005)]. 
8 The literature on the effects of transfers from central to local governments is, of course, very large, and to the 
extent that such transfers represent fiscal windfalls our paper relates to this entire line of research. Much of this 
literature focuses on the possibility of a “flypaper effect,” whereby local public expenditure appears more elastic to 
federal transfers than to (local) tax revenues [e.g. Gramlich anf Galper (1973), Strumpf (1998), Wyckoff (1988), 
Hines and Thaler (1995), and Lutz (2006)]. 
9 Throughout the paper we use “oil” as a shorthand for “oil and (natural) gas.” Oil accounts for about 90% of the 
value of output of the oil and gas sector. 
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the payment, and distribute it to the various recipients. In Appendix 1 we give a detailed 
description of the (very complicated) rules for the allocation of royalties. Here we summarize the 
main points. 
 
Federal law mandates that Petrobras pay close to 10% of the value of the gross output from its 
oilfields in the form of royalties. The recipients of royalties include: the ministry of the navy, the 
ministry of science and technology, state governments, and municipal governments, the latter 
two both directly, and indirectly through the division of a “special fund” into which some of the 
royalties are paid. The shares of royalties going to these sets of recipients differ between onshore 
and offshore oil. As a rough order of magnitude, however, in both cases municipal governments 
are the ultimate beneficiaries of about 30% of the royalty pie, i.e. roughly 3% of the value of 
gross oil output. This can result in substantial royalty revenues for some municipalities: in the 
top 25 municipalities by per capita oil output, royalties accounted for about 30% of municipal 
revenues in 2000. 
 
The rules for the allocation among municipalities of the municipal share of royalties also differ 
between onshore and offshore oil. In both cases, however, a municipality’s royalty income 
depends on several factors. Some of these factors are purely geographic, and we discuss them in 
greater detail below. Other determinants of royalty participation, however, are not geographic. 
For example, municipalities on whose territory is located infrastructure for the storage and 
transportation of oil and gas or for the landing of offshore oil, or are even only “affected” by 
such operations, are also entitled to some. Furthermore, some components of the royalty 
allocation scheme depend on the size of the municipality’s population. For these reasons, royalty 
income is not a credible exogenous measure of the windfall received by municipalities thanks to 
oil. This consideration plays an important role in our identification strategy, which we discuss 
below. 
 
Another source of “Petro-Reais” for oil-producing municipalities is the “Special Participation” 
(not to be confused with the “Special Fund” mentioned above), a tax on oilfield output – a 
royalty in all but name – part of which, once again, is given out to municipalities bearing a close 
geographic relationship with the corresponding oil. The overall value of the “Partecipacao 
Especial” is similar to the overall value of royalties. For example, in 2004 royalties amounted to 
R$5735 Millions, while the Partecipacao was R$5995 Millions. However, royalties are more 
important to municipalities, which receive between 20 and 30% of the royalties while 
producing/facing municipalities are only entitled to 10% of the “Participacao” [de Oliveira Cruz 
and Ribeiro (2008), Mendes et al. (2008)]. 
 
III. Specification, Data, and Identification 
 
III.A Specification. 
 
Our units of observation are all Brazilian áreas mínimas comparáveis (AMCs), statistical 
constructs slightly larger than municipalities, for which we have detailed outcome variables 
(we’ll explain this shortly). For this population, we present results from two sets of empirical 
models. The first set of results is generated by OLS estimation of the specification 
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Ymt = αt + βt Qmt + γt Xm + emt,                                           (1) 
 
where m indexes AMCs and t indicates year, Ymt is an AMC-level outcome in year t (e.g. AMC 
GDP), Qmt is a measure of AMC-level oil output, Xm is a set of the following AMC-level 
geographic controls: latitude, longitude, an indicator for whether the AMC is on the coast, 
distance from federal and state capital, a state capital dummy, and state fixed effects. The Greek 
letters are parameters to be estimated, and emt collects the effect on Y of the unobservables. Note 
that we allow the coefficients to vary over time. The outcome variables Ymt that we consider for 
specification (1) are aggregate GDP, sectoral GDP, and municipal revenues. The time coverage 
is typically 2000-2005. To interpret this exercise as uncovering the causal effect of oil 
production on Y we need Q to be uncorrelated with the residual determinants in e. We give this 
argument in section III.C.  
 
The second set of results is from instrumental variable (IV) estimation of the following model 
 
Wm = α + β Rm + γ Xm + em,                                           (2) 
 
where the set of instruments is [Qm Xm]. In these specifications Wm is a set of AMC outcomes, 
including reported spending on various municipal-budget outcomes, real provision of public 
goods and services, transfers, household income and poverty rates, etc.; Rm is municipal-
government revenue; Xm and Qm are, as before, AMC-level geographic controls and oil output, 
respectively; the Greek letters are parameters to be estimated and em collects other determinants 
of the outcomes. Essentially, specification (2) uses specification (1) (with Y being municipal 
revenues) as its first-stage regression. Note however that variables and coefficients here are not 
time varying, i.e. this specification is for a single cross-section, typically for the year 2000. This 
is because of limitations in the time coverage of the data.  
 
The idea behind the instrumental-variable approach is to isolate the effect of the marginal Real of 
revenue due to oil (the marginal Petro-Real). For this interpretation to be legitimate, we need Q 
to affect W only through its effect on R. Again, this argument is in Section III.C. Of course, we 
also need to show that we have a strong first stage. We show this when we present the results for 
(1). 
 
Specification (2) is most transparently interpreted in levels. However, as a robustness check, and 
to fully control for baseline characteristics, we also report results where (2) is estimated in first 
differences. The exact period over which we take first differences depends on availability of data 
on outcomes and municipal revenues, but in most cases it is 1991-2000 (i.e. between the last two 
censuses). We show below that in 1991 oil was only a minor source of revenues for oil-rich 
municipalities.10 
                                                 
10 The specification in first-differences has the flavor of a difference-in-difference exercise, where the first-stage 
captures the effect of the (heterogeneous) treatment (having varying amounts of oil) on the change in revenues, and 
the second stage shows how the change in revenues affects various outcomes of interest. However the analogy is 
imperfect because out treatment is not the change in oil but the amount of oil produced in 2000. The reason of 
course is lack of data on 1991 oil output. Since oil production, the percentage of oil distributed as royalties, and the 
reference price to compute the value of the oil for the purposes of royalty calculation have all increased substantially 
since the early 1990s, the 2000 level may be a reasonable instrument for the change in revenues due to oil between 
1991 and 2000. 
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As an alternative to specification (2), in order to gauge the effects of oil-related revenues, we 
could have simply regressed the socio-economic outcomes we are interested in on the oil 
royalties received by AMC, which we observe. However, as explained above, some of the factors 
determining a municipality’s share in the royalties are not purely geographic, implying that 
royalty income is potentially endogenous to other municipality-level outcomes. For example, 
local conditions correlated with our outcomes of interest may also affect whether a municipality 
hosts oil-transportation infrastructure, or the size of its population, both of which enter the 
royalty-allocation formula.  
 
III.B Data 
 
AMCs. Over the decades the number of Brazilian municipalities has increased, as many of them 
have split into two or more – largely as a consequence of perverse incentives in the mechanism 
that assigns federal transfers to municipalities (transfers per capita are strongly decreasing in 
population size) [Brandt (2002)]. This fragmentation complicates the analysis of panel data on 
municipalities, as some of today’s municipalities did not exist twenty or more years ago. To deal 
with this problem, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), which is the direct source 
for much of our data, makes data available at the AMC level. Each AMC contains one 
municipality (or more) such that the area of each AMC remains relatively stable even when 
municipality boundaries change.  
 
Our empirical work is conducted almost entirely at the AMC level. The main reason for this 
choice is that we wish to test for random assignment of oil. In order to do so, we need to compare 
outcomes before (most of the) oil was discovered. This requires panel data. Altogether, more 
than 5500 municipalities that exist today are pooled into 3659 AMCs. 
 
Many of the variables we use in the paper are directly available from IPEA at the AMC level. 
Others are available – or must be first constructed – at the municipal level. In these cases we 
collapse the municipal-level data to the AMC level using a cross-walk from IPEA. One of these 
variables is our key variable, oil output. Additional details on the AMC cross-walks are in 
Appendix 2. 
 
Oil Output. This variable measures the value of oil extracted in each AMC. Here we give a 
detailed description of how we construct this measure. This involves essentially two steps: (i) 
build a dataset of oil output for each oilfield; (ii) allocate the oil output of each oilfield among 
municipalities according to an appropriate rule based on their mutual geographical relationship. 
 
Step (i) is relatively easy, as ANP reports detailed price and production data for each oilfield. 
This allows us to compute the value of oil and gas produced each year in each oilfield from 2000 
to 2005.  
 
Step (ii) differs for onshore and offshore oil. For offshore oil we take advantage of the 
geographic component of the royalty-allocation formula. As discussed, Petrobras pays royalties 
(through the ANP) for oil extraction to municipal governments, and one component of the 
royalty allocation formula is based on the principle that a certain percentage of the value of the 
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output of each offshore oilfield must be paid to the “municipalities facing the oilfields.” To 
implement this principle a mechanism had to be devised to determine for each oilfield which are 
the “facing” municipalities. The principle that has been followed apportions the royalties based 
on the fraction of the oilfield that lies within each municipality’s borders’ extension on the 
continental shelf. The application of this principle, however, is complicated by the fact that there 
exist two sets of municipality maritime borders: one based on extending the land borders through 
parallel lines, and one based on perpendicular lines. This complication is finessed by distributing 
50% of the royalties (due to facing municipalities) according to one set of borders, and the other 
50% according to the other. The resulting percentage allocation is collected in a document called 
“Percentuais Médios de Confrontação” or average shares of “facing,” i.e. shares of each 
municipality in an offshore oilfield based on the “facing” criterion. We use these shares to 
allocate oil output from each field to the various municipalities. We refer again to Appendix 1 
for a more detailed discussion. 
 
For onshore oil we were able to use a simpler algorithm. We combined GIS data on the 
(terrestrial) boundaries of municipalities with similar data on the boundaries of onshore oilfields. 
We then simply shared equally the oil from a certain field among the municipalities that lie 
above it.  
 
Besides municipality-level oil output we also create an indicator for having a positive share of at 
least one oilfield. There are 124 municipalities with a stake in at least one (onshore or offshore) 
oilfield. After aggregation, this results in 103 oil AMCs. Figure 2 shows a map of Brazil with 
AMC boundaries and oilfields, both onshore and offshore. Additional details on the construction 
of the oil output data and in Appendix 2. 
 
Other data. Other data used in the paper can be broadly classified in four groups: (i) measures of 
economic activity (GDP, both aggregate and sub-aggregates); (ii) budgetary items (revenues and 
spending, by function); (iii) welfare-relevant socio-economic outcomes (many, but not all of 
which originate in the household census); (iv) geographic controls. Sources and, when needed, 
additional details on these data are given in Appendix 2. 
 
Deflation. Many of the economic variables we used were obtained directly in R$2000. Other 
variables were denominated in nominal R$, and we converted them to R$2000 using a CPI index 
from IPEA (Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor - INPC). 
 
Summary statistics and subsamples. Table 1 present some summary statistics from various 
subsamples in our dataset. The first column reports figures calculated from the subsample 
formed by the 3556 AMCs that do not share any oilfield. The second column is based on the 
subsample of 59 oil-endowed AMCs where the oilfield was discovered after 1970. The reason 
for highlighting AMCs with oilfields discovered after 1970 is that, as we will see, we can rule 
out that municipalities where oil was found after 1970 were systematically different in key 
outcome variables (after controlling for geography) from non-oil AMCs before discovery. In the 
third column we show data from all 103 oil-abundant AMCs. In the fourth and fifth column we 
report data from the subsample of 31 AMCs that only have offshore oil, and the 63 that only 
have onshore oil, respectively. Loosely speaking, the municipalities in the “No oil” column can 
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be thought of as our “control group,” while the municipalities in the four subsequent columns 
represent alternative “treatment groups” that we use throughout the paper (more on this below). 
 
There are clearly sizable differences in average GDP per capita, municipal revenues, and 
population between oil-rich and oil-poor AMCs, the oil-rich ones generally being richer and 
larger, and enjoying greater revenues (except for onshore ones, which get less revenues). 11 These 
differences, however, can clearly not be treated as causal. As is clear from the geographic 
variables also reported in the table, the distribution of oil is far from uniform throughout Brazil. 
Oil-rich AMCs tend to be systematically to the North and to the East of non-oil ones. More 
importantly, oil-rich AMCs are disproportionately coastal (the offshore ones by construction, but 
the onshore ones are also much more likely to be on the coast than the no-oil ones). There are 
also substantive differences in distances from federal and state capitals. Finally, oil AMCs are 
somewhat more likely to contain a state capital. To identify the causal effect of oil it is therefore 
essential to control for these geographic characteristics. We also control for state fixed effects.  
 
The table also reports some statistics from the distribution of our constructed measure of oil 
output per capita, these being trivially 0 for the no-oil subsample.12 It is important to keep in 
mind that our oil output measure corresponds to a gross output concept, so it is not directly 
comparable to the GDP numbers in the table. Nevertheless the following back-of-the-envelope 
calculation can be used to get a sense of the importance of oil in oil-rich municipalities. In the 
national accounts value added in the oil sector is about 40% of gross output. Applying that 
percent to the average gross output number in Table 1 we find that, depending on the subsample, 
oil accounts for between 15 and 20% of GDP in oil AMCs. Another important message from 
Table 1 is that there is massive variation in oil output within oil-rich subsamples, with the 90th, 
95th , and 100th percentiles all being large multiples of the mean. This underscores the fact that 
our identification of the effects of oil comes as much from within oil-rich variation as from 
between the no-oil and the oil-rich samples (hence the sense in which our use of the words 
“control” and “treatment” above should be taken very loosely). 
 
III.C Identification 
 
We begin the discussion of our identification assumptions by arguing that Qmt is uncorrelated 
with emt in specification (1). The first step is to show that key outcomes of interest did not differ 
in oil-rich and oil-poor AMCs before oil was discovered. As we have just seen, oil and non-oil 
AMCs differ in a number of geographical characteristics, particularly with regards to their 
positions relative to the coast and their distance from federal and state capitals. This means that 
oil is spuriously correlated with other covariates. But our claim is that oil is as good as randomly 
assigned conditional on geographic covariates (state fixed effects, longitude, latitude, distance to 
federal capital, distance to state capital, state-capital dummies, and coastal dummies). In other 
words, once we compare oil and non-oil AMCs with similar geographic characteristics, oil-
abundance status is random.  
                                                 
11 To convert R$2000 to 2008 US dollars the appropriate conversion factor is roughly 1. Our reason for reporting 
GDP for 2002 (instead of 2000 as for the other variables) is discussed later. 
12 We should point out that there are a few cases of zero oil output even among the “oil AMCs.” This is because the 
oil-AMC dummy is constructed based on having a positive share in an oilfield that was operating in 2007 (see 
Appendix 2). Some of these fields were still in the development stage (or still undiscovered) in 2000. 
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The main test for the validity of the conditional random-assignment assumption is reported in 
Table 2, which shows results from a panel regression of the following model 
 
Ymt = δt + ηt Qm,2000 + θt Xm + wmt,                                   (3) 
 
where Ymt is GDP per capita in AMC m and year t, and Qm,2000 is oil output per capita in AMC m 
in the year 2000. In the first column the sample is constituted by the “no oil” and the “post-1970 
oil” subsamples, i.e. the AMCs in the first two columns of Table 1. The time coverage is given 
by various dates from 1970 to 2005. In the intervening years before 2000 we include all years for 
which per-capita GDP at the AMC level is available. After 2000 we have annual data and pick as 
“representative” dates 2002 and 2005, with the significance of 2002 still to be further explained 
below. Crucially, the coefficient on oil output in 2000 is allowed to vary over time.  
 
Our main reason for focusing on the period since 1970 for our falsification test is that going back 
before 1970 would significantly reduce the number of AMCs, due to boundary changes during 
and before the 1960s. In addition, as we mention shortly, we also perform falsification tests on 
outcomes other than GDP, and some of these (particularly related to housing – an important 
variable for us) are not available before 1970, irrespective of the level of AMC aggregation.  On 
the other hand, most oil discoveries (and nearly all of the offshore discoveries) were made after 
1970, so not much is lost by not presenting results for the pre-1970 period. 
 
It is quite clear that sizable systematic effects from oil do not appear until well into the 1990s, 
and indeed we must wait for the 2000s to observe a clear relation between oil and GDP. Since 
the oil AMCs are only those where oil was discovered after 1970, this is strongly indicative that, 
conditional on our covariates, AMCs did not differ among each other in a way that was 
correlated with their subsequent oil production. As robustness checks, the remaining columns 
include all oil AMCs, and break down oil AMCs into onshore and offshore categories. The 
conclusion that AMC GDP varied with oil only after the period of oil discovery (conditional on 
geography) seems extremely robust.13 
 
Further support for our claims of quasi-random assignment (conditional on the above mentioned 
covariates) is provided in Appendix Table A1, where we repeat the specification in (3) (for 
t=1970 only in order to save space) for other dependent variables for which we have data from 
1970 and on which we focus below: housing quality and education (again, we discuss these 
variables in more detail below). Once again, conditional on the geographic controls the outcomes 
in 1970 are almost universally uncorrelated with oil output in 2000. The two exceptions are years 
of education in the onshore sample, which is positively and statistically significantly associated 
with oil abundance in 2000, and households with electric lighting in the offshore sample, which 
is (marginally) significantly negatively associated with oil (this last result disappears when we 
restrict the sample to offshore oil AMCs and the AMCs that are contiguous to them). 
  
                                                 
13 Why did it take 30 years for oil to show up in the GDP numbers? First, oil discoveries occurred gradually over 
time since 1970 (Figure 1), so in the earlier years only a fraction of the “oil AMCs” is producing oil. Second, even 
for the early starters, there are inevitable lags between the time of discovery and the time where the oilfield is being 
exploited at its full capacity, so oil output in 2000 is much larger than output in previous years.  
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Hence, our assumption that oil output is conditionally randomly assigned seems to hold. This in 
itself goes a long way in providing support for the identification of model (1). However, even if 
initial conditions were invariant to the oil abundance, one could in principle still be concerned 
that among oil AMCs the quantity of oil extracted, say, in 2000 is endogenous to other AMC-
level shocks occurring after discovery. Similarly, one could be concerned that prospecting 
decisions and discovery events after 1970 could have been influenced by shocks occurring after 
1970. 
 
We argue that this is implausible. Oilfield operations in Brazil over the sample period were 
carried out by a global hydrocarbon giant that has full access to global factor and product 
markets. Neither its highly specialized equipment, nor its equally-specialized labor force could 
realistically be expected to be drawn locally, so local factor prices should not be a consideration. 
Other than the physical presence of the oil, and the morphological characteristics of the oilfield, 
we think it utterly unlikely that Petrobras is influenced by temporary local conditions in deciding 
how much oil to extract from a given oilfield, and even less that it is swayed by local economic 
outcomes in its prospecting plans.  
 
Another possible concern is that municipalities compete to lobby and/or bribe Petrobras to drill 
near them, or to influence the amount of oil extracted in a given location. This is exceedingly 
unlikely. First, municipalities are tiny and it is nearly inconceivable that they will have the 
political heft and financial resources to sway the decisions of Petrobras, one of the World’s 
biggest companies. Second, unlike many Brazilian institutions, Petrobras actually has a strong 
record and reputation for integrity – at least in recent years. This record has been explicitly 
recognized by international NGOs operating in the natural-resource area, e.g. Transparency 
International (2008). 14 
 
We now briefly turn to identification of model (2). As mentioned, here the key assumption is that 
our instrument, oil output Qm, affects outcomes of interest at the municipality level (mainly 
spending by the local government, provision of public goods, services, and transfers, and 
household income) only through the revenues Rm it generates for the municipal budget (the bulk 
of which is represented by oil royalties). Our main defense of this identifying assumption is 
given by an anticipation of the results from estimating (1). As we show below, the effect of oil 
output on AMC non-oil GDP is essentially zero. For offshore oil, we also find no effects on the 
composition of non-oil GDP (onshore oil has a minor effect). This strongly suggests that oil has 
little market effects on economic activity at the AMC level (and for offshore oil the effect is nil), 
and that any effect from oil likely arises from the revenues it brings to the municipal 
government.  
 
Since the absence of market linkages from oil to the local economy is particularly clear in the 
case of offshore oil, our most cleanly identified results are perhaps those pertaining to the 
                                                 
14 The same cannot necessarily be said about the ANP, which collects and distributes royalties, and some of whose 
officers have recently been involved in a scandal. This makes sense. Unlike distorting Petrobras’ decisions as to 
which oilfields to develop and how much to produce, which is a decision with gigantic financial consequences, 
distorting on the margin royalty payments from an existing field seems a more realistic and feasible option for 
municipalities bent on gaming the royalty system. This is another reason why we chose to treat oil output as 
exogenous and royalty income as potentially endogenous. 
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subsample where the treatment group is composed of municipalities that derive their oil only 
from offshore fields, and in our discussion we emphasize these results. However, once we focus 
on the offshore group only we are obviously relying on a very small sample of “treated” AMCs, 
and the results are bound to depend on variation among a handful of AMCs. For example, the top 
two AMCs ranked by oil output per capita are critical to identify the effect of oil abundance on 
revenues.15 While this is obviously not a problem conceptually (that’s where the variation is!), it 
induces us to also always report results for the full sample with all municipalities (where the 
results are extremely robust to taking out subsets as large as the 10 top AMCs, again as measured 
by oil output per capita) as a robustness check. 
 
Another issue relevant to identification is the role of population flows. Since our outcome 
variables are per capita, and since for many of the outcomes we tend to find little if any positive 
welfare effect from oil abundance, one possible concern is that oil discoveries in a certain locale 
attract migratory flows which dilute the benefits on a per-capita basis. Appendix Table A2 shows 
that there is no significant effect of oil on population, so our conclusions below are probably not 
driven by changes in the denominator. 
 
As a final robustness check on our identification strategy, we also re-estimated the regressions in 
our paper using only the AMCs that have offshore oil (and no onshore oil) and the adjacent 
AMCs. The benefit of this alternative strategy is that it uses AMCs that were likely more similar 
to those that produce oil before oil discoveries took place. The cost is that this alternative 
strategy reduces sample size. Also, one may be concerned that nearby AMCs might be indirectly 
affected by oil. Hence, in general, we prefer the full-sample results and do not report these 
estimates in the paper. However, they were generally very similar (both in magnitudes and 
precision) to the results that we do report (we flag at the appropriate points the few occurrences 
where these results differed).  
 
IV. Results 
 
IV.A Oil Abundance and GDP 
 
In Table 3 we estimate the effects of oil abundance on the productive side of the local economy. 
The specification is (1), with AMC GDP on the left-hand side, and AMC oil output, interacted 
with a year dummy to allow for time-varying coefficients, as the main right-hand-side variable. 
A full set of interactions between each of our usual geographic variables and year dummies are 
also included.16  
 
                                                 
15 The top two AMCs by oil output include the municipalities of Rio das Ostras, Casimiro de Abreu, Macaé, 
Quissamã, and Carapebus, all of which are well-known large royalty recipients. When they are simultaneously 
omitted from the offshore-only sample, the point estimates do not change very much but the standard errors increase 
massively. When AMCs are dropped one at a time all the results in the paper are robust.  
16 The construction of the GDP numbers (both aggregate and sectoral) appears to be based mainly on firm- and 
consumer surveys as well as on tax returns. A description of the principles underlying the construction of these 
numbers can be found in IBGE (2008). 
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We begin our sample period either in 2000, or in the first year after 2000 for which we have 
reliable data.17 This brings us to the repeatedly promised discussion of the significance of 2002. 
It turns out that our measure of GDP in oil-abundant municipalities experiences a dramatic 
discrete drop between 2001 and 2002. An investigation of the data-construction measures behind 
the IPEA figures reveals that up to 2001 inputs into oil extraction were misattributed to the AMC 
where operations headquarters were located, rather than – correctly – to the AMC were the 
extraction took place. This mistake resulted in a vast overestimate of oil GDP at the AMC level, 
because it essentially amounted to using gross oil output to measure oil GDP. Needless to say, 
the overestimate of oil GDP carried over to aggregate AMC GDP, which was thus also grossly 
overestimated. The year 2002 is the first year for which this mistake was removed.18  
 
In interpreting the coefficients in Table 3 it is important to recall that the right-hand-side 
variable, oil output, is a measure of gross output, while the left-hand-side, GDP, is a measure of 
value-added. Consider what this implies, for example, for the regression in column 1, where the 
dependent variable is aggregate AMC GDP and the coefficient on oil output is fairly stable over 
time and hovers around 0.4. Because aggregate GDP is the sum of oil and non-oil GDP, this 0.4 
is the sum of the direct effect of $1 worth of oil extracted on oil GDP and its indirect (or 
spillover) effect on non-oil GDP. Now as already mentioned at the national level the share of oil 
GDP in gross oil output is also fairly stable and around 0.4.19 Under fairly standard assumptions 
average and marginal shares of GDP in gross output are the same, so to the extent that the 
national numbers are representative of local production relations the results in column 1 are 
prima facie evidence that oil production has little if any (positive or negative) spillovers on non-
oil economic activity.20 
 
We also have AMC-level GDP numbers disaggregated into industrial (manufacturing, 
construction, mining, and utility services) and non-industrial (agriculture, government, and 
services) GDP. In columns 2 and 3 we look at the effects of gross oil extraction on these two 
subaggregates. Since oil GDP is part of industrial GDP, column 2 has much the same 
interpretation as column 1, and since coefficients are still stable and close to 0.4 they suggest that 
in the typical oil-rich AMC oil production has little if any spillovers on other industrial 
subsectors. Similarly, column 3 shows essentially no spillovers from oil to the service sector. 
                                                 
17 The first year for which we have both GDP and oil output numbers is 1999, but since in the rest of the paper data 
limitations force us to focus on the year 2000, we decided to begin with that year here as well. 
18 This mismeasurement does not invalidate the falsification exercise we conducted in the previous section. The 
point of that exercise was to show that differences among municipalities were not systematically related to oil 
abundance before (and for several years after) the oil discoveries. Inflation in oil GDP numbers in oil-rich 
municipalities would only work against our case, by tending to make the effect of oil to seem to “kick-in” earlier 
than it did. 
19 Here is the annual time series of the ratio of GDP to gross output in the oil sector in the national accounts 
between 2000 and 2005: 0.49, 0.40, 0.35, 0.36, 0.35, 0.42. Source: 
ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Contas_Nacionais/Sistema_de_Contas_Nacionais/Referencia_2000/2004_2005_novembro2007/
Tabelas_de_Recursos_e_Usos/ 
20 Needless to say, it would have been cleaner to simply obtain a measure of non-oil GDP and regress it on oil 
output. Regrettably, despite numerous attempts, we have been unable to obtain the figures used by IBGE for oil 
GDP, so we cannot net it out of aggregate GDP to obtain non-oil GDP. We do know that oil GDP at the municipal 
level is computed by distributing Petrobras value added according to a geographical formula similar to the one used 
by ANP to allocate (the geographical component of) royalties to municipalities [IBGE (2008) and email exchanges 
with IBGE staff]. 
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This last result is important because in this case the no-spillover conclusion does not rest on an 
(admittedly uncertain) estimate of the share of oil GDP in gross oil output, as is the case for 
aggregate GDP or industrial GDP. In columns 4 and 5 we show that these results are robust when 
AMCs where oil was discovered before 1970 are included in the analysis. 
 
There is reason to expect that the extent of spillovers from oil production to the rest of the 
economy may differ depending on whether the oil is located onshore of offshore. As we 
discussed in Section III.C, neither onshore nor offshore oil production are likely to draw directly 
from local factor markets. However, onshore oil production could affect the composition of 
demand on non-oil product markets. In particular, it could increase the relative demand for 
personal services to the oilfield workers and business services to the oilfield operations. In the 
absence of migration flows to fulfil this demand (and we have seen above that such migration 
has not materialized), this would lead us to expect onshore oil to shift the composition of non-oil 
GDP away from industry and towards services, a particular (though not necessarily malign) case 
of Dutch Disease. 
 
Some support for this hypothesis is found in the last four columns of Table 3. In offshore-only 
oil AMCs we find the usual one-for-one increase in industrial GDP with oil GDP (i.e. roughly 
0.4 coefficient on gross oil output), and no change in non-industrial GDP. This is consistent with 
offshore oil having no market impact on the local economy. On the other hand, in onshore-only 
oil AMCs the effect of oil on industrial value added is less than one-for-one, as the coefficient on 
gross oil output falls to approximately to 0.3. Continuing to use 0.4 as the rule of thumb for the 
share of value added in gross oil output this implies that a one Real increase in onshore oil GDP 
causes a 25-cent decline in non-oil industrial output.21 At the same time, however, we find a 
symmetric positive effect on non-industrial output: the coefficient of about 0.1 implies that one 
extra Real of oil GDP increases non-industrial GDP by 25 cents. It seems, then, that onshore oil 
causes some minor reallocation of local productive factors from industrial to non-industrial 
activities. 
 
VI.B Oil Abundance and the Local Government Budget - Revenues 
 
Having failed to find significant market effects of oil abundance, we turn to possible effects 
flowing through the government budget. We begin by investigating the effect of oil on the 
revenue side of Brazilian municipalities’ budgets. Table 4 confirms that oil riches flow in part 
into local-government budgets. The specification is still the same as (1), only with various 
measures of municipal revenues as the outcome variable. To save on space we focus on a single 
cross-section, and since for several other variables we analyze below we only have data for 2000 
we chose 2000 here as well. 
  
Column 1 shows significant increases in revenues received by local governments from oil in 
2000. One Real of gross oil output increases total local-government revenues by almost 3 cents. 
This is true for the subset of oilfields discovered after 1970 as well as for the full sample, and for 
the subsample including only offshore-only oil AMCs. The effect is muted in the sample 
including onshore-only oil AMCs, where one Real of oil produced leads to just a 2 cent increase 
in government revenues. One shortcoming of the results in column 1 is that there are missing 
                                                 
21 Throughout the paper we use “cent” for “Centavos,” or one hundreds of a Real. 
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values for municipality revenue in 2000 for about 11 percent of the AMCs. In column 2 we use 
2001 values to impute the missing observations for 2000 (so we are now missing only about 3 
percent of AMCs), and the anomaly for the onshore-only subsample disappears: one Real of oil 
output increases revenues by about 3 cents in all subsamples.  
 
In column 3 of Table 4 we investigate the sources of the increase in revenues. In particular, we 
look at the effect of oil production on royalty income. The increase in royalty income accounts 
for almost two-thirds of the overall increase in municipality income due to oil production.22 The 
bulk of the remaining one-third is almost-certainly accounted for by the “Special Participation,” 
discussed in Section II. 
 
One very important implication of Table 4, and of the fact that oil municipalities have larger 
revenues, is that the money received from oil operations is not offset by a reduction in federal 
government transfers to the local government. Indeed, the fact that the increase in revenues is 
larger than the royalties suggests that there is not even a partial offset. Similarly, since revenues 
increase substantially, it does not seem that municipal governments take advantage of royalty 
income to cut local taxes. 
 
As mentioned in Section III.A, in the remainder of the paper we estimate specification (2), in 
which municipal revenue is the right-hand-side variable, both in levels and first differences 
(whenever we can). The earliest date for which we have good coverage of both municipal 
revenues and outcomes of interest is 1991, so many of the first-differenced regressions we 
estimate are for 1991-2000. In order to establish the validity of 1991 as a base year for the 
differenced regressions, column 4 of Table 4 shows the coefficient of a regression of 1991 
revenues on oil output in 2000. The results show that municipal revenues in 1991 where much 
more weakly (one order of magnitude less) related to oil-abundance than in 2000. Some of the 
reasons for this are already familiar: many of the oilfields were discovered late in the century, 
and development lags further delay the impact of the discoveries on municipality budgets. 
Furthermore, the local-government “take” in local oil output increased dramatically after a wide 
ranging reform enacted in 1998 that, among other things, radically increased the “reference 
price” used to evaluate output for the purposes of computing royalties (basically making it the 
market price), and increased the typical overall tax – to be distributed in the form of royalties – 
from 5% to 10%.  
 
The validity of 1991 as a baseline is reinforced by column 5, where we regress the change in 
revenues between 1991 and 2000 on 2000 oil output. The coefficient is essentially the same as in 
the level regression for 2000.  Note that column 2 is essentially the first stage for our subsequent 
IV regressions in levels and column 5 for our subsequent IV regressions in differences.23 
 
VI.C Oil Abundance and the Local Government Budget - Spending 
 
                                                 
22 Column 3 only includes AMCs included in column 2. When we include all municipalities for which we have 
royalty income the coefficients are the same up to the fourth decimal figure. 
23 In columns 4 and 5 we predict missing 1991 data on municipal revenues using 1992 data, and in column 5 we 
continue predicting 2000 municipal revenues for municipalities that did not report revenues that year using 2001 
data.  
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So oil brings money to the local government. What does the local government do with it?  
We begin in Table 5 with what the government says it does, i.e. we look at the effect of oil on 
reported spending. To establish a baseline, the first row of the top panel shows simple OLS 
regressions of spending on some of the functions that account for the largest shares of the 
average municipality budget on total revenues. The most important items are Education and 
Culture, on which municipalities report spending about 27 cents of the average Real that comes 
into their coffers, and Health and Sanitation and Housing and Urban Development, each of 
which receives about 10 cents on the Real. Transportation and Transfers to Households also 
receive significant shares of spending by function, about 7 cents on the Real. 24 Overall, total 
reported spending accounts for about 90 cents of every Real of revenue, consistent with the fact 
that Brazilian aggregate municipal statistics show a surplus for 2000. 
 
The OLS results describe the reported allocation of the average Real of revenues, independent of 
its source. In order to identify the utilization of oil-related revenues, in Panels B and C we turn to 
our empirical model (2), where municipal revenues are instrumented for by oil output. In other 
words, we treat the regressions in Table 4 as first-stage regressions in a two-stage least-square 
estimation of the effect of increases in revenues on spending. We emphasize results for the 
sample in which the “treatment group” is composed of the AMCs with only offshore oil (Panel 
C) because – as discussed above – the case for the validity of this procedure is particularly 
compelling in this case. But results using all oil AMCs as the treatment group give very similar 
results (Panel B). 
 
Our IV results show that the largest reported beneficiary of the increase in government revenues 
from oil is Housing and Urban Development, with almost a fifth of the marginal “oil Real.” 
Education and Transportation share second place, with about 13 cents each, Health continues to 
receive about 10 cents, and Transfers to households 5 cents. Hence, we find significant 
differences between the allocations of the marginal Petro-Real and the average Real of 
revenue.25 For offshore oil the overall effect on spending is also different, as it drops to about 83 
cent per Real, indicating that the saving rate out of oil-related revenue is higher than for general 
revenue. 
 
The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the results in nine-year differences. Results using 
differenced outcomes are nearly identical to those using levels. 
That oil output increases the reported size of municipal-government budgets is confirmed by 
simple summary statistics on the size of administration and personnel costs of municipal 
governments. We computed administration costs in 2000 (as usual using 2001 values where 2000 
                                                 
24 Education spending by municipal governments is mostly in the area of primary schooling. Health spending 
includes local clinics and hospitals. Housing comprises the planning, development and construction of housing in 
both rural and urban areas. Urban Development includes urban infrastructure. Transfers to households include 
“Social Assistance” (to the aged, to the handicapped, to children and communities) and “Social Security.” We do not 
have the year 2000 breakdown of these two items but in 2004 (and subsequently) the latter accounted for about 2/3 
of the total. Nevertheless, social security is probably fairly tightly linked to retirement patterns, and hence to the 
demographic structure of the AMC’s population. Hence, we conjecture that social assistance is more discretionary 
and hence the relevant component at the margin. 
25 More formally, the 95% confidence intervals for the offshore IV coefficients do not overlap with those for the 
OLS coefficients in columns 1, 3 and 4. 
17
 
 
information is missing), for the top 25 AMCs ranked by oil output per capita. More specifically, 
we measured municipal administration costs after controlling for our usual geographic covariates 
(this is just the residual from a regression of municipal administration costs per capita on state 
dummies, coastal dummy, etc.). We found that of the 25 top oil AMCs in 2000, 10 were in the 
top decile and an additional 5 were in the second decile of the administrative-cost distribution. 
Moreover, 4 (out of 25) were in the top 1 percent! (Results using unadjusted administrative costs 
are slightly less dramatic, but still show a large over-representation of oil AMCs among the 
biggest spenders on administration). 
IV.D. Oil Abundance and Public-Service Provision 
 
Table 5 shows that oil-related revenues feed increased reported spending on housing and urban 
services, transportation, education, health, sanitation, and transfers to households. The purpose of 
this section is to look at a variety of measures of real outcomes in all of these areas, to see to 
what extent the increased reported spending leads to material improvements in living standards. 
 
Table 6 looks at a variety of housing, urban service and infrastructure outcomes: overall value of 
the residential housing stock, a proxy for housing quantity (rooms per person) and measures of 
quality of housing and infrastructure, namely the fraction of the population living in favelas, 
connection to electric, water and sewage networks, piping, garbage collection, and extent of 
roads under municipal jurisdiction. All these variables bar roads are constructed from the micro-
data of the Brazilian household census (Censo Demográfico).26 The length of roads under 
municipal supervision is constructed by us from administrative records.  
 
While the OLS results tend mostly to show a positive association between government revenue 
and housing and transportation outcomes, the IV results are in most cases indistinguishable from 
0. In the offshore sample the one robust exception is the percent of the population not living in 
favelas, but here the coefficient has the “wrong” sign: oil-related government income leads to a 
worsening of housing quality and infrastructure!27 The only significantly positive coefficient is 
the one for the percentage of households that enjoy garbage-collection services in the level IV 
regression, but this result disappears in first differences. It is also worth noting that while the IV 
estimates using offshore oil are (not surprisingly) less precisely estimated than the OLS, their 
95% confidence intervals do not overlap in 8 of the 18 regressions, and in each of these 8 cases 
the IV estimate is smaller. 
 
In Table 7 we look at actual inputs into education (number of teachers and of classrooms, both in 
2000 and 2005) and health (hospitals and clinics in 2002), and certain transfers received by 
                                                 
26 Residential-capital values are based on Census data on housing characteristics and location, which are then 
converted into Reais through a hedonic model. The number of rooms is the total number of rooms, not just 
bedrooms. We also note for readers unfamiliar with Brazilian data that the Brazilian “census” is really a 
representative sample covering approximately 12% of the population. 
27 In the first-difference IV specifications also the value of residential capital and the fraction of population with 
linkage to the water network take significantly negative coefficients (the former is borderline significantly negative 
even in levels). 
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households in 2000 (these include transfers for the alleviation of poverty, unemployment 
benefits, and incentives for schooling for poor families).28 
 
The results on education and health are slightly more encouraging than those for housing and 
road networks. In the specification in levels, three out of four variables associated with the 
provision of education services increase significantly with oil-generated revenues, and while two 
of these disappear in the first-difference specification, the positive impact of the number of 
teachers in 2005 appears robust to first-differencing, though just so. The point estimate (in 
levels) implies that a million Reais of extra revenue leads to the hiring of 4 teachers with a 5-year 
lag (3 teachers in first-differences). Even so, these numbers seem disappointing. According to 
Table 5 a 1 million increase in municipal revenues leads to about a R$130,000 increase in 
reported spending on education, so if all spending on education was on teachers and classrooms, 
they would imply that hiring a new teacher costs 130,000/4≈R$32,000 (interpreting our results as 
indicating that there are no new classrooms built). Given that per capita income is roughly 
R$4,000, this implies that either primary teachers are paid in the order of 8 times the average 
income, or there are substantial amounts of missing money in the education budget.29 
 
In column 5 and 6 we look at municipal health infrastructure. In levels there is a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the number of municipal hospitals, which almost survives first-
differencing (where the t-statistic drops to 1.9). The coefficients can be interpreted as saying that 
a R$100M increase in oil-related revenues leads to the construction of approximately one extra 
hospital. While R$100M is an enormous amount in the context of Brazilian municipalities, it is 
difficult to say with confidence whether this number is too large or too small, or just right, as 
health spending is probably targeted at other items as well, so we can’t infer the “effective price” 
of a health-care facility for an oil-rich municipality from this figure alone. In the first-difference 
specification there is also a positive effect on clinics, but this vanishes in the level regressions.  
 
Finally, in column 7 we look at the effect of oil-related revenues on poverty- and unemployment-
related social transfers from the population census. There is no indication whatsoever that these 
welfare-like payments increase with oil revenues. To the contrary, the coefficient is significantly 
negative!30 
 
Taken together, the results from Tables 5, 6 and 7 are potentially troubling. Reported spending 
on housing, transportation, education, health, and social transfers all respond strongly to 
                                                 
28 Note that for the first-difference specification we use 1992 and 1996 as our base years for health and education 
variables since those are the earliest years for which we have outcomes that are comparable to those in our later year 
of data. Also, we don’t have base-year transfer-income numbers, so this result is only available in levels. 
29 There are at least two caveats to this calculation. One is that there are items in the education budget other than 
teachers and classrooms (though teachers and classroom should be the bulk of it). The other, which goes in the 
opposite direction, is that the calculation implicitly treats the estimate for the 2005 outcomes as the elasticity of 
these outcomes to 2005 oil revenues. Recall, however, that our right-hand-side variable is 2000 revenues, and the 
instrument is 2000 oil production. We cannot directly estimate the 2005 elasticity because of too many missing 
value in the revenue data. However, when we estimated reduced form regressions of teachers and classrooms per 
capita on oil output per capita for 2000 and 2005 we obtained very similar coefficients. Since the 2000 IV 
regressions show little effectiveness of oil revenues on real educational output, the results for 2005 also suggest little 
improvement in the intervening years. 
30 In Table 7 the confidence intervals of the OLS and IV estimates for offshore oil do not overlap in 6 cases (out of 
13) and in each of these 6 cases the IV estimate is lower. 
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revenues from oil, but when we look at indicators of real outcomes in these areas we find effects 
that seem extremely small compared to the reported budget items. The only possible exception is 
in the health-infrastructure area, where we are unable to benchmark our real outcomes to assess 
their magnitude vis-à-vis what one should plausibly expect, though the suspicion even there is 
that the “implicit price” of what is being bought is too high. 
 
IV.E Limitations of the Results on Public Service Provisions 
 
We now discuss some important limitations to the conclusions we have just drawn.  
 
(i) Wrong Outcomes. First, of course, we might be looking at the wrong outcomes. Namely, it 
could be that increased spending on housing, transportation, etc. show up in variables other than 
the ones we used to identify outcomes in these areas. Alternatively, it is conceivable that much 
socially-productive spending is misclassified under the headings of Table 5, and shows up in 
areas entirely different from the ones we have drawn our outcome variables from. This is a real 
concern because the allocation of municipal spending across various functions is notoriously 
inaccurate, so conceivably the “true spending” is elsewhere.  
 
In principle, we could try to address this concern directly by adding further outcome variables to 
the left hand sides of our regressions. As should already be clear, Brazil offers an astonishingly 
rich variety of information on socio-economic variables at the municipal level, and the variables 
we look at are just a subset of those available – or that could be constructed. However, a truly 
exhaustive search over all the possible socio-economic outcomes would quickly become 
unmanageable, and we must draw the line somewhere. The variables we have selected and used 
in Tables 6 and 7 reflect our – admittedly subjective and informal – ex-ante assessment of (i) 
their relevance to households’ welfare; and (ii) the likelihood that municipal governments will be 
able to influence these outcomes. 
 
While we can’t feasibly cover the universe of possible outcomes, our failure to find convincing 
evidence of productive use of oil revenues is spread over a sufficiently wide range of variables 
that it seems implausible that we have systematically oversampled from the subset of outcomes 
with no positive effects. In any event, as a partial way of addressing these concerns, in the next 
section we further look at the effects of oil revenues of household income, as an alternative (and 
summary) measure of living standards. 
 
(ii) Time to build. A second possible concern is that we fail to identify positive effects because 
spending produces benefits only with some lag. For example some of the spending is directed at 
infrastructure projects and these may take a few years to complete. The comparison between 
columns 1-2 and 3-4 of Table 7 lends some credence to this view, where 2005 outcomes seem to 
respond more strongly to 2000 revenues than 2000 outcomes. In assessing the importance of this 
concern a number of considerations are relevant. First, not all of our outcome variables are 
plausibly subject to “time to build.” In particular, there is no great delay needed to hire teachers 
or mail transfer payments to households. Second, there is no effect whatever of spending in 2000 
on municipal roads in 2005, even though transportation is one of the significant winners from oil 
revenues. Even the positive education outcomes in 2005 are suggestive of inefficient spending, 
as argued above. Third, it is important to keep in mind that municipal revenues from oil are 
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persistent over time. AMCs with relatively large revenues in 2000 tend to have had relatively 
large revenue for at least two or three years, so our coefficients should not necessarily be 
interpreted as measuring the impact effect of 2000 revenues. Rather, they should be thought of as 
capturing the cumulated effects of several-year worth of Petro-Reais. When these considerations 
are taken into account, there is perhaps no strong reason to worry about time to build.  
 
(iii) Crowding out of state and federal spending. The items in the state and federal functional 
spending budget are essentially the same as in the municipal budget, and the “division of labor” 
between different levels of government in Brazil is blurred. It is therefore conceivable that state 
and federal bodies withdraw funding in areas where they are aware of increased spending by 
municipal governments. We can rule out this concern in the areas of education, health, and 
transportation, because our road, teacher, classroom, and health establishment variables all come 
with the qualifier “municipal,” as they refer to provision by municipal governments. They are 
therefore net of state and federal contributions, and as such not subject to crowding out.31 
 
Still, it is interesting to see if federal and state provision in these areas responds to municipal oil 
revenues. We investigate this question in Appendix Table A3. We find few statistically 
significant coefficients, and almost none robust to both level and first-difference specifications. 
Only for clinics we find a robust negative coefficient. This result deepens the gloom of the 
picture that is emerging. In Table 7 we found no robust evidence of an increase in municipal 
clinics, and now we have just seen that oil revenues reduce state and federal clinics. Hence, one 
is lead to the conclusion that oil revenue actually reduces the total supply of outpatient care! 
 
Another variable that speaks to the issue of crowding out is the value of federal contracts per 
capita. Brazilian mayors can individually negotiate deals with the federal government to finance 
specific projects. It is possible that mayors who are awash in oil revenues exert less effort to 
secure such funding.32 In column 8 of Table A3 we test this conjecture and find some support for 
it, especially in the full sample (in the offshore-only sample the coefficient is not quite 
significant, but close). However, the crowding out is minimal: one Real of oil-related revenues 
only displaces between 1 and 3 cents of federal contracts, so the overall impact of oil on the 
funds available to the municipality is virtually unaffected. In conclusion, we don’t feel that 
crowding out is a likely first order driver of our results.33 
 
                                                 
31 There are federal and state transfers to municipalities earmarked for education, health, and road construction, but 
crucially these transfers show up as revenues in the municipal budget, as well as as spending items corresponding 
functional categories (we have confirmed this in private communications with a Brazilian fiscal expert). But now 
recall that we observe both revenues and reported spending increasing with oil, so crowding out of these transfers 
cannot be the explanation for our results. 
32 We are grateful to Fred Finan for alerting us of this issue and making this data available to us. Of course federal 
contracts are a concern only if the funds secured through these contracts are not included in the data on total 
municipal revenues. If they were, we would already know that total municipal revenues net of any crowding out of 
mayoral effort to secure these contracts go up with oil, and all our inferences would be unchanged. The problem 
only arises if these contracts are off-budget, so that one may worry that the observed increase in budgetary revenues 
is offset by a decline in off-budget contract financing. Since we were unable to establish conclusively whether these 
contracts are on- or off-budget we report the results in Column 8. 
33 Litschig (2008) also looks at whether fiscal windfalls due to discontinuities in the allocation formula for federal 
transfers crowd out other sources of revenues, and finds no evidence of this. 
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(iv) Large confidence intervals. Perhaps the most serious concern is that – as is frequent for IV 
estimates – the standard errors are quite large. Our failure to find significant improvements in 
provision of public goods and services may therefore stem as much from imprecision of the 
estimates as from a true lack of effectiveness of public spending. There is a handful of cases 
where we can rule this out convincingly, namely when the upper bound of the 95% confidence 
interval is negative. Focusing as always on the offshore-only results, this occurs in Table 6 in 
Column (1) (where the upper bound is essentially 0) and (3), for both levels and differences 
specifications, as well as in columns (7) and (8) for the difference specification. It also happens 
in Column (7) of Table 7, where we only have the levels specification. At a minimum, we can 
conclude that with considerable confidence oil-related fiscal windfalls destroy the provision of at 
least some public goods and services. 
 
For the outcome variables with positive 95% upper bounds on the coefficient estimates we 
present in Appendix 3 some back-of-the-envelope calculations to infer possible implied 
“minimum prices” of public goods (or bundles of public goods). This exercise leads to a fairly 
clear conclusion in the case of the housing and urbanization outcomes in Table 6: even if all 
first-difference coefficients in columns (1)-(8) simultaneously took their 95% upper-bound 
values (and those for which the 95% upper bound is negative are set to 0), it would cost more 
than R$200,000 to house and connect to services 5 families – while reasonable independent 
figures for the same bundle would suggest that the cost should be in the neighborhood of 
R$100,000. Similarly, the cost of roads seems excessive, even in the very optimistic scenario that 
the coefficient in column (9) takes its upper bound value. 
 
Unfortunately, in the case of the levels regressions for the housing variables, as well as in all 
cases for the education and health variables, the results of the bounding exercise are not as 
conclusive: if true coefficients all take their 95% upper bound values, then the corresponding 
bundles of goods and services are not necessarily over-priced. Coupled with the fact that our 
bundles are “incomplete,” in the sense that we do not observe all of the goods and services the 
oil money is buying, we cannot completely finesse the large-standard-error issue.34 
 
IV.F. Oil Abundance and Household Income 
 
So far we have looked at the effects of oil abundance on the productive structure of the non-oil 
economy, on the government budget, and on the supply of a number of public services. The latter 
exercise generates some questions as to the extent to which the reported spending increases 
actually materialize in services to the population. Nevertheless, it is still quite possible that the 
population benefits from the government’s expansion of the budget in ways that are not directly 
captured by our indicators of public-good provision.35 Hence, in this section we study the effect 
                                                 
34 Needless to say the probability that all the coefficients take simultaneously their upper-bound value is nearly 0. 
Another dimension in which our calculations are very aggressive is that they ignore accumulated revenues from 
previous years that could have translated into a better stock in the cross-section. 
35 For example, if all the extra money for urbanization goes into tending public gardens and playgrounds, we would 
have seen no benefits in previous tables (as we do not have measures of the quantity and quality of such public 
spaces), but we might see an improvement in incomes, from the people who get hired to tend these spaces (unless 
such public employment crowds out private employment one-for-one, which is implausible). Another, less benign 
mechanism that could be picked up by the analysis in this section is that of “patronage jobs,” where the government 
hires people to do nothing. This would be consistent with a substantial expansion in reported spending, say on 
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of oil-induced government revenue on a summary measure of living standards: namely 
household income per capita, which we compute from the Brazilian census.36 
 
Table 8 reports estimates of the effects of oil-generated municipal revenue on household income 
per capita. The specification is always as in (2). Column (1) shows that there is no effect on 
average household income whatever in the IV regressions. These results suggest that the reported 
expansion in the government budget has not lead to aggregate increases in living standards that 
we have somehow missed in the previous section.37 
 
In the next five columns we look at the effect of oil on average income within each quintile of 
the household income distribution. This gives a somewhat more nuanced view than looking at 
the average effect. In particular, we do find fairly robust evidence that household income 
increases in the bottom quintile of the income distribution. Nevertheless, it is important to notice 
that these increases are small: for every per-capita Real of increased revenue (and spending), the 
increase in income is in the order of ten cents. To benchmark this number, consider this: suppose 
the government mechanically rebated each Real of oil-related income to all households in the 
municipality equally (and there were no additional general equilibrium effects). Then all five of 
the coefficients in columns (2)-(6) should simultaneously be 1. 
 
In the last column of Table 8 we look at the effect of oil on poverty rates. In the full sample, 
using the specification in levels, we find evidence that oil may have reduced poverty, but this 
result vanishes in first differences and, more importantly, in our better-identified regressions 
using offshore oil only as the treatment. Taken together, these estimates suggest that poverty 
reductions due to oil were modest, at best.38 
                                                                                                                                                             
urbanization and infrastructure, no real improvement in good and service provision, and an increase in household 
income from the beneficiaries of the patronage.  
36 We refer as household income per capita to the following construct. (i) For each individual record in the census 
divide household income by household size; (ii) sum all the resulting individual incomes (using census weights); 
(iii) divide by population. It may be more accurate to refer this to as a measure of personal income, rather than 
household income, but we use household income to flag the fact that the raw data report household income for each 
individual. 
37 It is useful to relate this finding to our previous results. We already know that oil affects local GDP only through 
its own direct contribution, and has no spillovers on non-oil GDP. Still, household income could increase if there 
were local under-utilized factors of production that became mobilized in oil production and participated in the 
distribution of oil GDP. If this was the case, our instrument would be invalid – but the IV coefficient would be 
positive, because it would reflect the positive reduced-form relation between oil GDP and incomes. The fact that this 
is not so therefore reinforces our previous contention that oil production does not use local factors. (To double check 
this we estimated directly the reduced-form relation finding insignificant coefficients.) The fact that non-oil GDP 
does not change in response to oil production also rules out many channels through which the fiscal windfall could 
ultimately increase household income. If (real) demand for goods and services by the government increases, and is 
satisfied at least in part by locally-owned factors of production, particularly labor, household income would likely 
increase, but so would GDP (if the increased demand by the government completely crowds out production targeted 
to the market then neither household income nor GDP will increase). This leaves increased transfers to the 
population as the only mechanism through which oil revenues could increase household income that is not implicitly 
ruled out by our previous finding that non-oil GDP is unaffected. To some extent, therefore, the result in Column (1) 
may be interpreted as a robustness check on our GDP results. 
38 Even the significant coefficient for the level regression in the full sample implies minuscule effects. The 
coefficient estimate implies that municipal revenues due to oil need to increase by 100 Reales per capita to see a 
reduction in poverty of one percentage point. This is more than the average revenue from oil royalties in the oil 
abundant sample (see Table 1). 
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Given the foregoing considerations, the most plausible reading of Table 8 is that oil production 
does very little for household income. Individual citizens seem to be almost isolated from the oil 
windfall, at least as measured by their income. Results from the reduced-form regression of 
household income on oil abundance (available on request) tell a very similar story. Hence, the 
evidence continues to convey a concern with “missing money.” 
 
V. Where is the missing money going? 
 
Where is the missing money going? It is difficult to resist the suspicion that much of it is 
diverted to private use by government officers. One outcome variable that may speak to this 
issue, albeit very indirectly, is the relative size of houses enjoyed by municipal employees, which 
can be easily identified in Census data from the already-used quality of housing variables cross-
checked against respondent’s sector of employment. Table 9 reports the results. It seems clear 
that oil-related revenue increases the quality of housing for municipal workers – but, as we 
already know, not for everyone else. Whatever the mechanism, municipal workers seem to be 
able to obtain for themselves relatively more spacious accommodations in oil-rich municipalities. 
 
To shed more light on the “missing money” question, we gather new data on the frequency with 
which different municipalities are cited in the news media in connection with corruption. 
Specifically, for each municipality in Brazil we search all the news items in the archives of 
Brazil's News Agency’s (Agência Brasil) website. In a first search, we look at all news items that 
include the name of a municipality, the (Brazilian) Portuguese word for mayor (prefeito), and the 
Portuguese word for embezzlement (desvio). We then construct a municipality-level dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the search delivered at least one hit, and 0 otherwise.39  When 
we regress this variable on per capita oil output in 2000, with our usual set of controls, we find 
insignificant estimates. However, when we use the absolute level of oil output in 2000 as a 
regressor, our estimates become statistically significant for all AMCs, and also separately for 
offshore and onshore oil separately. These results are reported in the top panel of Table 10. In a 
second search, we repeat the same exercise using the word for corruption (corrupção) instead of 
embezzlement, and the results are very similar (mid-panel of Table 10). Results using the word 
for fraud (fraude) are also qualitatively identical. We conclude that high oil output per capita 
does not make a municipality more likely to be cited for irregularities in the news, but more oil 
output per mayor does. 
 
To further examine whether oil-rich municipalities are likely to be involved in illegal activities 
requiring federal involvement, we examined a list of Federal Police operations for 2003-2008.40 
Of the 723 federal police operations listed, we searched the abstract for an occurrence of at least 
one of the following 12 words: benefícios, cidade, cofre, corrupção, desvio, fraude, fundo, 
                                                 
39 We used a simple 0-1 indicator instead of the actual number of hits because many municipality names are 
identical to state names or have other meanings in Portuguese. This means that there are some huge outliers in the 
distribution of hits. To prevent these outliers from dominating the results we have chosen the dummy-variable 
approach. The search was over all 5,507 municipalities that existed in 2000. The corresponding AMC-level 
dummies took a value of 1 if at least one municipality in the AMC took a value of 1. 
40 These are official administrative data available from the Federal Police’s web page: 
http://www.dpf.gov.br/DCS/Resumo_OP_200X.html, where X=5, 6, 7, 8 or 3-2004 (for example, for 2008 the link 
is here: http://www.dpf.gov.br/DCS/Resumo_OP_2008.html; 2003 and 2004 are reported together). 
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irregular, licita, municipais, município, prefeito (each with capital letter as well as lowercase 
letter in the start). We found 241 operations that satisfy this requirement. For each of these 
operations we searched the top 10 items in a Google search for the name of the operation, to see 
whether a current or past mayor was involved, and, if so, we recorded this mayor’s municipality. 
As before, we used this to construct an indicator for whether at least one of the municipalities in 
each AMC had a mayor involved in a federal police investigation. The results, reported in the 
bottom panel of Table 10, are very similar to the news articles: per capita oil output in 2000 does 
not increase the odds of a federal police operation, but the absolute level of oil output in 2000 did 
increase those odds. As before this result holds for all AMCs and also when we use offshore and 
onshore oil AMCs separately.  
 
As an informal check on the nature of the allegations behind news stories and federal police 
operations, we made a broader search of the news media on the 10 most oil-rich municipalities 
(as measured by oil output in 2000). Some of the stories we picked up are summarized in Table 
11, and they appear to support the view that corruption in oil-rich municipalities is a serious 
concern. One of the stories we found related to “Operação Telhado De Vidro” (“Operation Glass 
Ceiling”) in the municipality of Campos dos Goytacazes, the largest oil producer in 2000. In 
March 2008, a large number of local-government officials at the highest level were accused of 
diverting up to R$250 million (which were worth at the time about 140 million dollars). This is a 
very large sum, much larger than the average municipality’s annual budget, though still only a 
fraction of the royalties received by Campos dos Goytacazes over the past decade.  Of course, 
some of the allegations may turn out to be unfounded, or the result of special attention given to 
oil rich municipalities. But our results about the very limited improvements in standards of living 
and the recent nature of some of the cases suggest that these stories may only be “the tip of the 
iceberg”, and that many other cases may have as yet gone undetected or unreported. 
 
Another piece of the puzzle that may possibly help shed further light on our results is that oil-
related municipal revenues appear to have a significantly positive effect (both in the “all” and in 
the “offshore only” samples) on the homicide rate (homicides divided by population). For 
example, the point estimate in our level IV regressions for the offshore sample implies that 
R$1M of extra oil-related revenues leads to 0.45 extra homicides (0.7 in the first-difference 
specification). Admittedly, this effect is small in magnitude. Furthermore, unlike other results we 
reported it is less robust to restricting the sample only to offshore-oil-rich municipalities and 
those municipalities that share borders with them, in which case p-values are .093 and 1.167, 
respectively. Nevertheless, it does contribute to a picture of increased criminal activity, possibly 
linked with corruption, associated with oil-related fiscal windfalls.41 
 
There is also some circumstantial evidence that the general public is ill informed about the 
magnitude of the oil-related fiscal windfall. In Campos dos Goytacazes, mentioned above as the 
largest oil producer of Brazil, the local news bulletin “Petróleo, Royalties & Região” conducted a 
few surveys to assess the local population’s knowledge about oil royalties. Perhaps the most 
                                                 
41 The dependent variables in these regressions are the average homicide rate over the years 2000, 2001, and 2002 
(level regressions) and the difference between the 2000-2002 and the 1991-1993 averages (difference regressions). 
Since we don’t have population in 1992 and 1993 we used 1991 population to computed homicide rates in 1991 and 
1992, and for consistency we did the same for 2001 and 2002. The results are unchanged when using only homicide 
rates in 2000 and 1991 (i.e. no time averaging).  
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relevant question was asked in May 2004, when respondents had to choose a range of values for 
the monthly fiscal receipts due to oil. In answering this question 66% of respondents 
underestimated, i.e. picked a range below the “correct” interval of $R20m to $R50m. Only 15% 
overestimated.42 To put these results in perspective, Campos has received R$ billions in oil 
revenues over the last few years, and the surveys were conducted well after royalty money 
started to flow. Also, the level of education in Campos dos Goytacazes is higher than in most of 
Brazil (an average over 6 years in 2000, compared with about 4.2 for the average AMC), and in 
the survey better educated people displayed relatively more knowledge regarding royalties. 
Finally, being in the state of Rio De Janerio, Campos is probably better covered by the media 
than most of Brazil. Thus, public ignorance regarding the extent of oil revenues may be even 
higher in more rural and remote parts of Brazil.43 
 
Before concluding this section it may be appropriate to discuss how the “missing money” result 
and our hypothesis that most of it is appropriated by top local officials relates to national-account 
identities that, after all, need to hold. There can be no question that GNP in oil-rich communities 
increases. While local factors of production do not seem to share in the distribution of oil GDP, 
the government receives a significant fiscal windfall. Hence, ΔGNP ≈ Fiscal Oil Revenues. On 
the expenditure side, the change in net exports (value of the oil minus the royalties, which are 
kept locally) cancels out with the value of net factor payments from abroad (since all inputs are 
owned outside the municipalities, all exports net of the royalties are negative NFPs), leaving the 
change in GNP to be balanced by a combination of increased consumption (C), government 
spending (G), investment (I), and net exports (NX) (the expenditure-side formula for GNP is 
C+I+G+NX+NFP). As we have seen, municipal governments essentially balance this by 
reporting ΔG ≈ Fiscal Oil Revenues. Since our results indicate that the ΔG does not quite 
materialize we think that what really happens is ΔC ≈ Fiscal Oil, where ΔC is extremely 
concentrated among the very top municipal officials, and therefore goes undetected in the 
household income numbers. Alternatively top government officials save the embezzled funds in 
bank accounts outside the municipalities, which would “show up” on the expenditure side as a 
further increase in net exports. 
 
VI. Theoretical Implications 
 
The theoretical literature has proposed both market-based and political-economy mechanisms 
through which natural-resource abundance may affect economic outcomes and the welfare of the 
populace. As emphasized in the Introduction, there are several theoretical channels that are only 
                                                 
42 The results of this survey are reported in the fourth issue of the bulletin, which can be downloaded at 
http://www.royaltiesdopetroleo.ucam-campos.br/index.php?cod=1. There were a total of four surveys. The first was 
in 2002, and its main result was that substantial majorities (58 %) did not know what royalties were (the exact 
question was “Do you know what are royalties?”), and, of those who knew about the royalties, 54% did not know 
how they were used (bulletin 1). The second was in 2003, and 54% did not know what royalties were (bulletin 2). 
The third was in March 2004, and showed that 81% of respondents considered the municipality “rich” and 75% 
ascribed this wealth to “royalties, oil, or Petrobras.” The May 2004 survey also repeated these questions, with 
similar results (71% and 78%). Incidentally this bulletin, which continues to publish four issues per year, is a very 
interesting window on the concerns raised locally by the oil windfall. Among the most recurrent themes are the lack 
of transparency in the utilization of the royalties, and the perceived ineffectiveness of royalty money in promoting 
development and living standards. The September 2004 issue pointedly reports that one year of royalty money 
would be enough to build 18,890 social housing units (casa populares) or pay for a presidential election campaign. 
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applicable at the national level, and a limitation of our analysis is that we cannot detect the 
operation of such aggregate forces. The purpose of this section is to argue that this still leaves a 
significant number of theoretical mechanisms that could potentially operate in the local context 
that is our focus. Another purpose is to assess these mechanisms in light of our results. For 
completeness, we also briefly mention (in footnotes) some of the non-observable (to us) theories.  
 
Market-based mechanisms are broadly referred to as instances of Dutch Disease. A classic 
source of Dutch Disease arises from a wealth effect (sometimes called a “spending effect” in the 
Dutch-Disease literature). The mineral riches trigger a surge in demand for consumption goods. 
To satisfy the extra demand for non-tradables, resources are reallocated from the (non-resource) 
tradable to the non-tradable sector, while the extra demand for tradables is accommodated 
through increased imports (financed by the resource exports and, in some cases, external debt). A 
further consequence of the wealth effect is that it potentially depresses overall labor supply, 
leading to a combination of higher wages and lower overall non-resource GDP. This mechanism 
is clearly potentially at work in the local Brazilian setting. In particular a wealth effect could 
arise from the royalties received by the local government, to the extent that these royalties are 
rebated (directly or in the form of goods and services) to the local population. Evidence for such 
a mechanism would be represented by a decline of GDP in the (non-resource) tradable sectors 
and an increase in the GDP of the non-tradable sector. Evidence of a wealth effect would also be 
found in a decline in overall labor supply and an increase in local wages. 
 
Another market mechanism that may be present in our setting is due to the direct impact on 
relative demand by oil firms and oil workers for goods and services. In particular, there could 
be an increase in the relative demand for personal services to the oilfield workers, and of 
business services to the oilfield operations. This would lead us to expect oil to shift the 
composition of non-oil GDP away from industry and towards services.44 This particular type of 
Dutch Disease is not often studied in the theoretical literature, because it is not likely to be 
important at the national level. But it could be quite relevant at the level of the local economy. 
 
Both the wealth effect mechanism and the direct shift in relative demand from oil firms and 
workers change the composition of non-oil GDP, and our data do not allow us to establish 
whether the change is between tradables and non-tradables – as predicted by the wealth effect -- 
or between services to oil workers and firms and other activities – as predicted by the oil-
operation as local demand-shifters effect. However, our data allow us to distinguish between the 
effect of onshore oilfield operations and offshore ones. This is useful because both offshore and 
onshore operations pay royalties to the local government – so they are both potentially liable to 
create a wealth effect. Instead, only onshore operations are likely to directly affect the 
composition of demand for local goods and services. As we have discussed, offshore operations 
are miles off the coast and are largely disconnected from local factor and goods markets. We can 
therefore conclude that changes in the composition of non-oil GDP observed both in onshore and 
offshore oil AMCs are more likely to be due to a wealth effect, while changes confined to 
onshore AMCs are more likely due to the direct demand impact of oil-firm operations on local 
product markets. Furthermore, the wealth effect, unlike the relative demand from oil operations, 
                                                 
44 The net effect on aggregate municipality non-resource GDP is ambiguous. If the shrinking and expanding sectors 
have the same capital intensity aggregate GDP should increase. However if the expanding sector is more labor 
intensive aggregate GDP could remain unchanged or even fall.  
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should also be associated with a decline in labour supply and an increase in wages (outside the 
oil sector). 
 
As we have seen, onshore oil operations change (modestly) the composition of non-oil GDP, 
while offshore ones leave it unchanged; furthermore, in regressions not reported here there is no 
evidence of a decline in labor supply, nor of a significant increase in wages. This leads us to 
conclude that the wealth effect is probably not present in the local Brazilian context, while we do 
find some (modest) effect on relative demand for goods and services from onshore oilfield 
operations. One possible reason for the absence of a wealth effect, of course, is that the oil 
money is misappropriated by political leaders, so the population fails to experience an increase in 
wealth. Another possibility is that the oil income is used to provide public goods that are poor 
substitutes for private ones (and for leisure). Clearly our results are more consistent with the 
former explanation.45 
 
The theoretical literature has also identified several political-economy mechanisms that may be 
triggered by resource riches. In the classic mechanism royalty windfalls may increase rent 
seeking. Instead of producing marketable goods and services, a larger fraction of the population 
may be drawn into competing for political power and influence to secure for themselves a larger 
share of the income flowing into the municipality’s budget [e.g. Tornell and Lane (1999) , 
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006a, 2006b)]. Due to the effective decline in (productive) labor 
supply, rent seeking is consistent with a decline in value added in the non-oil sector, and 
particularly in the private sector.  As we have seen, we do not detect any such decline, so there is 
little support in the data for rent-seeking (as defined above) as an important mechanism in the 
local Brazilian context.46 
 
Other political-economy mechanisms focus on the incentives and constraints faced by incumbent 
political leaders. One force at work is that with larger resource windfalls controlling the local 
government becomes more attractive, so political incumbents face more aggressive challenges 
for their position. Faced with a greater likelihood of losing power, incumbents may adopt a 
shorter planning horizon, resulting in a decline in the supply of government-provided 
infrastructure and other productive public services. As a consequence, non-oil GDP may also 
decline. Other predictions of this mechanism are a decline in average duration in office for 
mayors (or, roughly equivalently, a decline in incumbency advantage), as well as an increase in 
embezzlement of public revenues. On the other hand mayors may respond to the potential threat 
                                                 
45 Among the versions of the Dutch disease model that our data cannot speak to, are those that focus on the 
reallocation of productive factors away from the non-resource and towards the resource sector. As discussed in 
detail in Section III.C, neither capital nor labor inputs are drawn significantly from the local economy, so this 
mechanism is unlikely to operate in our setting. Similarly we obviously do not expect Dutch-disease symptoms to be 
exacerbated by nominal exchange rate appreciation, as is often thought to happen at the national level, though of 
course had we had access to municipal-level price data we could check whether municipal real exchange rates (i.e. 
relative prices of nontradables) appreciate in response to oil finds. Oft-cited models of Dutch-disease featuring 
various combinations of the mechanisms discussed above include Corden and Neary (1982), Corden (1984), 
Krugman (1987), Wijnbergen (1994), Younger (1992), and Torvik (2001).  
46 Of course a clearly important form of resource-triggered rent seeking takes the extreme form of civil war [e.g. 
Caselli and Coleman (2008), Ross (2006)]. This is another example of a mechanism that we cannot pick up with 
within-country data, as is the fact that in some cases rent seeking over natural resources triggers the collapse of 
national-level institutions [Ross (2001a, 2001b)]. 
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from political challengers by improving the opportunity cost of such challengers. To this end, 
they may actually expand the provision of productive infrastructure and public services with a 
view to increase private-sector opportunities. Hence, the opportunity-cost argument has 
diametrically opposed prediction to the planning-horizon mechanism. Our results suggest that the 
provision of productive public services is essentially invariant to the amount of oil revenues 
received by the municipal government, and are therefore consistent with neither of these views. 
 
Yet another response by political incumbents may be to increase unproductive spending aimed at 
shoring up the political power base of the incumbent mayor, particularly through an increase in 
patronage, i.e. in an expansion of semi-fictitious government jobs to reward political supporters 
[e. g. Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2002), Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004)]. This 
mechanism mostly predicts an expansion in municipal-government employment.47 We do find a 
very modest increase in public employment, so qualitatively there is something to be said for this 
view. Quantitatively, however, the increase in patronage is extremely small, so this mechanism 
does not appear to be of first-order importance.48 
  
The shorter-horizon story is not the only one to predict increased embezzlement by public 
officials. Another view especially emphasized in the political-science literature is that royalties 
on natural resources are more easily stolen than revenue flowing from general taxation. The 
political science literature explains this difference on semi-behavioral grounds: citizens tend to 
monitor more closely the utilization of funds coming directly from their own pockets (taxes) than 
those not arising, so to speak, from their own efforts (royalties). An alternative explanation, 
which is perhaps more theoretically palatable to economists, is that royalty revenue is 
intrinsically less transparent, so citizens do not have a precise estimate of how much money the 
government has and cannot accurately assess the extent of diversion to private uses by 
government officials. In either case, our view is that the ease-of-stealing story appears very 
consistent with the empirical results. Oil money does appear to be uncorrelated with the 
provision of public goods and services (IV estimates), while other forms of revenue seem to be 
positively correlated with spending (OLS estimates). In addition, circumstantial evidence 
indicates that oil-rich municipalities are more corrupt. Finally, anecdotal evidence reveals 
widespread ignorance among the electorate on the magnitude of the oil-related fiscal revenues.49 
                                                 
47 The expansion in public employment following a resource windfall is a very rough proxy for the patronage effect. 
To the extent that some of the increase in public employment reflects genuine needs to manage the expanded size of 
the government budget, it is an overestimate. To the extent that patronage works by creating extra fictitious jobs in 
private firms that benefit from contracts from the municipal government, it is an underestimate. 
48 Caselli and Cunningham (2009) present a stylized toy model that nests the shortened-horizon, the opportunity 
cost, and the patronage effect, as well as several others that are unlikely to operate at the municipality level (e.g. 
more spending on political repression). Caselli (2007) shows that the relative importance of these mechanisms can 
vary with the level of development and with the size of the resource windfall, leading to potentially very non-
monotonic relations between resource revenues and outcomes such as government investment, political stability, and 
growth. 
49 To further bolster this interpretation we have re-run the regressions in Table 10 (corruption indicators on oil) 
controlling for total revenues. The effect of oil on corruption indicators survives. While these regressions do not 
admit a causal interpretation, they do suggest that oil output affects corruption-related outcomes even controlling for 
the revenue they generate. In a related contribution, Mendes (2005) finds that legislative expenditure in Brazilian 
municipalities (his proxy for capture of public funds) are much more strongly correlated with royalty revenue and 
other formula-based federal transfers than with revenues that can be more directly linked to local taxes. 
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Whether oil royalties are more or less easily stealable than other “windfall-like” sources, like 
foreign aid, remains an open question. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
We summarize our findings as follows. Offshore oil has no appreciable market linkages with the 
local economy: it does not use local factors of production, either directly or indirectly through 
purchases of locally-produced goods and services. As a result, local non-oil GDP is unaffected 
by the existence of offshore oil operations. Onshore oil triggers some reallocation of local factors 
of production from manufacturing activities to services, presumably through the direct demand 
for services by oil workers and firms. The net effect on aggregate non-oil GDP, however, is once 
again nil. There is therefore little evidence for traditional models of Dutch Disease, particularly 
those operating through a wealth effect. 
 
Both onshore and offshore oil generate significant increases in local-government revenues, 
mostly in the form of royalties. In turn, these revenue windfalls are matched to a very large 
extent by reported spending increases, particularly in the areas of urban infrastructure and 
housing, education and health services. However, we are unable to detect commensurate 
improvements in various socio-economic outcomes that would be expected to respond to the 
recorded spending increases. Furthermore, increases in household income associated with oil-
induced government revenues are modest-to-undetectable. We also present some suggestive 
evidence that some of the “missing money” is accounted for by corruption. 
 
Among the many theoretical models that have been put forward to link socio-economic 
outcomes to oil abundance and fiscal windfalls the one that seems most consistent with the data 
is the old political-science view that oil royalties are somehow more “stealable” than other types 
of revenues. The (indirect) evidence for this interpretation is that OLS results (roughly capturing 
the use of the average Real of revenue) are very different from the IV results (capturing the 
effect of oil-related revenue). Whether this is because citizens themselves are more tolerant of 
corruption when the money does not come from tax income, or whether they have less accurate 
information on the amounts flowing to the government in the form of royalties, we cannot say 
with the available data, though survey results from the largest oil-producing municipality elicit 
very little knowledge and understanding of the nature and magnitude of the royalty payments. 
 
Specific to the Brazilian context, our findings may imply that oil-rich municipalities should be 
given special consideration in the current trend towards greater decentralization (Lipscomb and 
Mobarak 2007) and in the design of audit schemes aimed at curbing corruption (Ferraz and Finan 
2008a, 2008b). This special focus may become even more important as the size of oil revenues 
and royalties flowing to oil-rich municipalities is bound to increase dramatically following the 
recent discovery of huge new offshore fields.50  
 
                                                 
50   Indeed, the issue is clearly of political relevance. De Oliveira Cruz and Ribeiro (2008) list 9 major pending 
Federal legislative proposals to reform the royalty system, all submitted in 2008. Interestingly, most proposals tend 
to reduce the share of royalties going to local governments, as well as to reduce discretionality in the use of royalty 
revenues. See also Afonso and Gobetti (2008). In the Summer of 2009 the Federal Government has issued its own 
new proposals for the property rights regime of the newly discovered  “pre-salt” giant oil fields. 
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More generally, our results may also be relevant to the growing emphasis placed on transparency 
by international donors in their dealings with poor, resource-abundant countries. In particular it 
is increasingly common for conditionality-based programs to feature stringent reporting 
requirements, both on the part of multinational oil companies and recipient governments. Our 
results may be interpreted as suggestive that accounting transparency per se may be insufficient, 
and that reporting schemes should document the actual effective disbursement of sums, and not 
merely their recording on balance sheets. 
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Appendix 1: Rules governing the allocation of royalties from oil and gas in Brazil 
 
This appendix is based on ANP (2001).  
 
The current allocation of royalties is the result of a series of incremental legislative changes 
between 1953 and 1998. The incremental nature of the legislation has resulted in a rather 
complicated structure, which we now try to describe. 
 
The total amount of royalty payments from each oilfield is the sum of two components. The first 
component is a fixed 5% of the value of the oil extracted. We call it the fixed quota. The second 
is a further percentage that must be between 0 and 5%. We call this the variable quota. However, 
even the variable quota is almost always set at the maximum of 5%. This is because the 
legislation authorizes ANP to assign a quota less than the maximum only in the case of lower-
quality or higher-risk fields. As a result about 90% of the oilfields and all of the large oilfields 
pay between 9.1 and 10% in royalties. Another 9% pays between 8.1 and 9%. Only 1% pays less 
than 8%. The weighted average royalty is 9.8%.  
 
This does not mean that the distinction between fixed quota and variable quota is irrelevant, 
though, because the sets of recipients of the two quotas, and the way the quotas are distributed 
among the various recipients, are very different. In particular, the fixed quota is divided as 
follows. For onshore fields, 70% to “producing” states, 20% to “producing” municipalities, and 
10% to municipalities with significant offshore-oil related infrastructure (essentially, terminals 
for bringing offshore oil to land). For offshore fields, 30% to “facing” states, 30% to “facing” 
municipalities, 20% to the Navy, 10% to a “special fund” to be divided between all states and all 
municipalities, and 10% to municipalities with significant oil-related infrastructure. We come 
back to the definitions of “producing” and “facing” below. 
 
The variable quota has even more recipients. For onshore oilfields, 52.5% goes to “producing 
states,” 25% to the Ministry of Science, 15% to “producing” municipalities, and 7.5% to 
municipalities “affected” by operations connected with the landing of offshore oil. For offshore 
oil, 25% to the Ministry of science, 22.5% to “facing” states, 22.5% to “facing” municipalities, 
15% to the Navy, 7.5% to the “special fund,” and 10% to “affected” municipalities. 
 
If one were to combine the percentages from the fixed and the variable quota, in the (typical) 
case of an oilfield paying the maximum royalty (i.e. 10%) then the total share going to producing 
municipalities in an onshore oilfield is 18%. For offshore fields, the percent of a 10% royalty 
going to facing municipalities would be 26%. Unfortunately, however, in the case of offshore oil 
things are not so simple, because the definition of “facing” is different in the case of the fixed 
quota and in the case of the variable quota. We thus now turn to the definitions of producing and 
facing. 
 
For onshore oil, a state (municipality) is a “producing” state (municipality) vis-à-vis a certain 
oilfield if and only if there are wells tapping into that particular oilfield that are inside the state’s 
(municipality’s) borders. Each producing state (municipality) participates into the total royalties 
allocated to producing states (municipalities) from a certain oilfield in proportion to the output 
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share of the wells situated in that state (municipality) in the total oilfield output. This is true both 
for the fixed and for the variable quota. 
 
For offshore oil, things get quite complicated. First of all, state and municipality maritime 
boundaries are needed. The relevant legislation assigns this task to the Brazilian Geographical 
Institute (BGE), and this has resulted into two distinct sets of borders. The first set is based on 
perpendicular lines. It begins by picking 25 points on the Brazilian coast, and connecting them 
by straight lines. It is necessary to “linearize” the coast because the fractal nature of the coastline 
would otherwise make it impossible to draw perpendicular lines going out to sea. The 25 points 
include all the points at which two coastal state’s boundaries reach the shore, but they also 
include a few extra points to accommodate extreme irregularities of the coastline inside a state. 
  
Once the coastline has been ‘linearized,’ parallel lines going out to see are drawn from the points 
where the state borders reach the coastline. These lines are deemed to be the continuation of the 
state border onto the continental shelf, and they “end” when they meet the outside boundary of 
the Brazilian continental shelf (i.e. the end of Brazil’s territorial water). 
 
Municipality boundaries based on perpendicular lines follow similar principles, with a few 
adjustments. First, in the states of Rio De Janerio and Sao Paulo, a few more points are added to 
the ‘linearization’ of the coast so the linearized version used for municipal boundaries is a bit 
more jagged than the one used for state ones. Second, municipal borders end either when they 
reach the continental shelf boundaries (as was the case for state borders), or when they reach the 
state boundary.  
 
The second set of boundaries is based on parallel lines. It amounts to identifying state 
(municipal) boundaries with the parallel passing by the point where state (municipal) boundaries 
reach the coast (and ending at the continental-shelf boundary). 
 
Once state boundaries are available, a municipality is “facing” a certain oilfield if there are wells 
tapping into this oilfield that lie inside the municipality’s maritime border. If the two sets of 
borders map the same well into two different municipalities they both have equal rights to the 
royalties.  
 
This is far from the end of the story, though. For, each identified facing municipality must share 
the “facing” quota with a set of neighboring municipalities, called the geo-economic area. The 
construction of the geo-economic area begins by identifying the “geographic mesoregion” to 
which the facing municipality belongs. The geographic mesoregion is a purely geographic 
construct that exists independently of the royalty allocation mechanism. Each municipality 
belongs to one and only one geographic mesoregion. 
 
Next, within the mesoregion, IBGE identifies a “main production zone.” The facing municipality 
must always belong to the main production zone. In addition, this zone includes municipalities 
with at least three of the following: (i) infrastructure for processing, treating, storing, and 
shipping oil (excluding pipelines); (ii) infrastructure supporting exploration, extraction, and 
shipment of oil (ports, airports, manufacture and maintenance of oil-rig equipment, etc.). 
However, it turns out that very few (i.e. eight) municipalities fulfill this criterion, so the vast 
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majority of the municipalities in the main production zone are the municipalities facing the oil 
wells. 
 
Once the main production zone is identified, the geo-economic area is the union of two sets: all 
the municipalities in the mesoregion, and all the municipalities that border the main production 
zone. In several cases, of course, the latter set is a subset of the former, but often that is not the 
case. Municipalities in a geo-economic area that are not in the main production zone are assigned 
to the “geographic zone contiguous to the main production zone.” Municipalities in the geo-
economic area whose territory is crossed by pipelines transporting offshore oil/gas are assigned 
to the “secondary production zone.” There are only 8 of these. All municipalities in the 
secondary production zone therefore also belong to the geographically contiguous zone, but if 
one municipality receives royalties by virtue of being in the secondary zone then it is excluded 
from division of royalties based on the contiguity criterion. 
 
Given the total royalties from the fixed quota going to a certain geo-economic area based on the 
“facing” principle (i.e. 30% of 5%), there is a first round of allocation that works as follows: 
60% to the main zone, 10% to the secondary zone, and 30% to the contiguous zone. Next, within 
each zone, each municipality’s share depends on its population size.51 Recall that in practice, the 
main zone tends to be constituted almost exclusively by the facing municipality, so in practice 
we should expect close to 60% of the 30% of the 5% to go to facing municipalities. 
 
Note that, as we have seen, the same oil well may well be inside two municipality’s borders, 
depending on the perpendicular or parallel principle. If the two municipalities are in the same 
geo-economic area this fact has no implications whatsoever for the allocation of royalties, as the 
identity of the municipality in whose border the well lies does not affect the allocation within the 
geo-economic area. But, of course, if the two municipalities are in different geo-economic areas 
then the number of municipalities sharing in the royalties increases accordingly. 
 
Finally, how is the total “facing” component of the royalty allocated between geo-economic 
areas? The principle is the same as for onshore oil, i.e. each geo-economic area receives royalties 
in proportion to the output share of the wells situated inside its maritime borders in the total 
oilfield output. 
 
Things are very different, and much simpler, for the variable quota. First, here it is facing 
municipalities only: nothing goes to the geo-economic areas. (Although there is a 7.5% separate 
quota for municipalities with infrastructure, but this is outside the “facing” quota). Second, and 
more importantly, the identification of a facing municipality is no longer based on the location of 
wells, but on the location of fields. In particular, for each field, the set of facing municipalities is 
the set of municipalities whose borders’ extensions on the continental shelf (whether drawn with 
perpendiculars or parallels) contain any portion of the field. 
 
                                                 
51 However, if one municipality in the main zone has at least three pieces of land-based infrastructure for 
processing, treatment, storage, and disposal of offshore oil it must receive at least one-third of the overall royalties 
going to the zone in which it sits. Hence, if the allocation based on population implies that this municipality receives 
less than one-third of the total, a new allocation is made where it receives one-third and the remainder is divided 
among the others based on the population criterion. In practice, only two municipalities satisfy this criterion. 
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The allocation of the overall 22.5% of the variable quota among facing municipalities is pro-
rated based on the simple average of the municipality’s share in the total field area based on 
perpendiculars and based on parallels. Hence, if a1(m,f)% of field f lies inside the maritime 
borders of municipality m by the perpendicular-line criterion, and a2(m,f)% according to the 
parallel-line criterion, then the royalties of municipality m (based on the “facing” criterion alone, 
and only on the variable quota) are  
 
(1/2) x [a1(m,f) + a2(m,f)] x 0.225 x q(f), 
 
where q(f) is the value of the output of field f. Accordingly, the formula by which we seek to 
assign offshore output to municipalities is 
 
(1/2) x [a1(m,f) + a2(m,f)] x q(f). 
 
Appendix 2: Data sources, construction, definitions, and limitations 
 
A2.A From Municipalities to AMCs 
 
IPEA has multiple AMC partitions, for different spans of time (e.g. 1920-2000, 1940-2000, etc.). 
Because of the progressive fragmentation of municipalities, the longer the time span the coarser 
the disaggregation (i.e. the fewer the AMCs). The earliest data we use in this paper are for 1970, 
so we use 1970-2000 AMCs. 
 
The crosswalk from municipalities to AMCs we use maps municipalities that existed in 1997 
into 1970-2000 AMCs. One slight complication is that the municipal-level variables we use are 
for 2000-2005, so there are a few municipalities that did not exist in 1997. In these few cases 
before applying the crosswalk we first assigned the new municipalities to 1997 municipalities 
“by hand.” 
 
We obtained the cross-walk from Eustaquio Reis of IPEA, to whom we are grateful. At the time 
of writing the cross-walks were also available online, e.g. at http://www.timthomas.net/. 
 
A2.B Additional information on the construction of AMC oil output 
 
For each producing oilfield and for every month since August 1998 ANP reports the reference 
price used to calculate royalties from oil and gas. For the same period, ANP also lists the 
quantity of oil and gas produced in each oilfield in each month. The value of annual output is the 
sum over the year of the values of monthly outputs, obtained by multiplying the reference price 
by the quantity produced. 
 
The reference price is the maximum between the actual sale price of the oil extracted in a 
particular field and an imputed sale price (for oil delivered to Petrobras-owned refineries) based 
on prevailing world-market prices for oil with similar chemical composition. In practice, the 
reference price is essentially indistinguishable from the market price, so our measure of field-
specific oil revenues should be very accurate. For details on the reference price see ANP (2001).  
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At the time of writing the reference prices by month and field were at 
http://www.anp.gov.br/?id=534, and the quantities extracted were at 
http://www.anp.gov.br/?id=532. 
 
The value of offshore oil is allocated to municipalities using the Percentuais Médios de 
Confrontação for February 2008. We have done some unsystematic checks to make sure that 
these shares do indeed reflect the stated geographical principles that should form the basis for 
these percentages. In most cases, they seemed fairly consistent. However, there were a few 
smaller oilfields for which the allocation of percentages did not seem consistent with the stated 
criteria. We have been unable to establish what alternative criteria had been used in these cases. 
We have also checked the shares published for other months (e.g. March 2009) and, as expected, 
found little variation over time. 
 
At the time of writing, a ling to the most recent Percentuais was at 
http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg=9188&m=&t1=&t2=&t3=&t4=&ar=&ps=&cachebust=1258621993
687. 
 
In order to identify onshore oilfields, and then allocate their output among municipalities, we 
first downloaded from Banco de Dados de Exploração e Produção (BDEP), a database 
maintained by ANP, a list of all fields that had passed the stages of development and were 
already producing in December 2007, as well as information on their geographical location. We 
then defined a field as onshore if no Confrontação shares existed for this field. For these onshore 
fields, we compared their geographical contours with those of the boundaries of Brazilian 
municipalities, obtained from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, IBGE. This 
allowed us to establish the geographical relationship between the various oilfields and the 
various municipalities.  
 
At the time of writing the BDEP map database was at 
http://maps.bdep.gov.br/website/maps/viewer.htm. The date of our download was March 3, 
2008. The IBGE map database was at http://mapas.ibge.gov.br/divisao/viewer.htm. For reasons 
discussed above we use the 1997 boundaries. 
 
The criteria for defining oil municipalities, as well as offshore and onshore oil municipalities are 
based on the same criteria for the classification of oilfields above. Namely, onshore-oil 
municipalities are those that lie above an onshore oilfield, while offshore oil municipalities are 
those with a positive Confrontação share. 
 
Variables downloaded from IPEA 
 
Any variable used in the paper whose source is not explicitly given in this appendix or in the text 
should be understood to have been directly downloaded (at the AMC 1970-2000 level) from the 
IPEA data web site, ipeadata. Most variable’s definitions are self-explanatory and/or given in the 
text of the paper. Here we only give a few additional details on a few that merit comment. 
 
Population. In estimating (1) and (2) we typically normalize both left- and right-side variables by 
population. Population data up to the year 2000 comes from IPEA, based on the Brazilian 
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Censuses. To calculate population for years after 2000 we inflated the 2000 population from the 
Census estimates of the percentage change in population residing in each AMC on 1 July of each 
year, as reported by IPEA’s. Similarly, there is one instance where we need population data for 
1992, and, again, we used a similar interpolation from the 1991 Census. 
 
At the time of writing, the URL for ipeadata was http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/ 
 
Variables not downloaded from IPEA 
 
Royalties. The amount of oil royalties received by each municipality in each year is available 
from ANP. At the time of writing the URL for the royalty data was 
http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg=9080&m=&t1=&t2=&t3=&t4=&ar=&ps=&cachebust=1258622130
031. 
 
Coastal Dummy.  While most of the geographic controls (latitude, longitude, distance from state 
and federal capital, state-capital dummy, and area) come from IPEA, we created an indicator for 
whether a municipality is adjacent to the coast using the IBGE GIS data referred to above (an 
AMC is coastal if at least one of its municipalities is coastal). 
 
Rooms at home. The number of rooms at home is a variable we computed ourselves from Censo 
Demográfico (question V0203).  The other variables in the first 8 columns of Table 6 are also 
constructed from census data but are directly available from IPEA at the AMC level. 
 
At the time of writing the URL for Censo Demográfico was 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/lojavirtual/fichatecnica.php?codigoproduto=7791&midia= and 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/lojavirtual/fichatecnica.php?codigoproduto=7792&midia= 
 
Municipal roads. We downloaded the raw data for the construction of our road variables from 
the Ministry of Transport’s web page. The dataset lists approximately 11,200 federal, state, and 
municipal paved roads, and provides GIS shapefiles. Combining these with the shapefiles for our 
AMCs we were able to determine the list of AMCs through which each road passes. The dataset 
also gives the extension of each road. We then apportioned the overall extension of each road 
equally among the AMCs that “share” in that road.  
 
The combined extension of the paved roads in the dataset is approximately 156,000km. 
According to Wikipedia the extension of paved roads in Brazil is approximately 200,000km, so it 
is possible our data are not exhaustive 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Brazilian_Highways). Nevertheless, at least for paved 
roads there is no reason that we are aware of to expect selection to specifically affect oil AMCs. 
(The coverage of our data is much poorer for unpaved roads, which according to Wikipedia 
account for the vast majority of Brazilian roads, but are only a small fraction of those in our 
dataset).  
 
We should also note that in our sample there are only approximately 500 municipal (paved) 
roads, so most municipalities are simply not in the business of building and managing roads. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see whether oil money induces some to enter this business. 
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At the time of writing the path to downloading the road data was the following. From 
http://www.transportes.gov.br follow links to BASE DE DADOS GEORREFERENCIADA, 
within which the relevant files can be found in the folder PORTFOLIOS DE 
PROJETOS\PORTFOLIOS\Modais. 
 
Teachers and Classrooms. We constructed the education data inputs using the microdata from 
the school census (Censo Escolar) an annual comprehensive collection of administrative 
information on all Brazilian schools, carried out by INEP. The cleanest and most up to date 
version of this data is widely available among researchers in the field. 
 
Clinics and Hospitals. The health data come from Pesquisa Assistência Médico Sanitária (AMS) 
2002, a comprehensive survey of the Brazilian health system carried out by the Ministry of 
Health. Hospitals are identified as “estabelecimentos” with “atendimento com internação,” while 
clinics are “estabelecimentos” with “atendimento sem internação.”  
 
At the moment of writing data on the Pesquisa AMS 2002 could be downloaded at 
http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/deftohtm.exe?ams/cnv/namsabr.def. 
 
Transfers received by households. Computed by us from Censo Demográfico (URL above). 
 
Household income. Computed by us (see text) from Censo Demográfico (URL above). 
 
Appendix 3: A Bounding Exercise for the Cost of Public Goods and Services when the 
Financing comes from Oil-Related Revenues 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to discuss rough lower bounds for the cost of providing public 
goods and services implied by Tables 6 and 7. Our calculations rely on heroic assumptions, but 
we think the exercise is nonetheless informative. 
 
To find lower bounds for the cost of goods and services we begin by choosing upper bounds for 
the coefficients in the tables. We begin with the upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals 
for the offshore, differenced IV regressions (panel F) for the housing variables in columns (1)-(8) 
of Table 6. These upper bounds are  
 
0.0000 0.0345 -0.0048 0.0041 0.0024 0.0025 -0.0056 -0.0125 
 
Clearly when the upper bound is negative we are quite confident that oil revenues “destroy” the 
corresponding services, but to focus on the rosiest possible scenario in this exercise we treat 
negative upper bounds as zero. The upper bound for per-capita residential capital is 0 to the fifth 
decimal digit, so we ignore it as well. This leaves us with positive upper bounds on rooms at 
home per 1000 adults, and percentages of the population receiving electricity, garbage collection, 
and piped water. 
 
To interpret these upper bounds begin with rooms at home per 1000 adults. The relationship we 
estimated is 
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Rooms*1000                            R 
----------------  =  a + 0.0345 * ------, 
P*(2/3)                                    P 
 
Where P is population, R denotes municipal revenues due to oil, 2/3 is a rough estimate of the 
adult population in the total population, a is a constant and 0.0345 is the upper bound on the 
estimated effect of oil revenue. Using this formula implies that a R$1 million increase in oil-
related revenues leads to the addition of 23 new rooms to the housing stock. The equivalent 
calculations for the other positive upper bounds imply that a R$1 million increase in oil-related 
revenues results in hooking up 4.1 more people to the electricity network, and brings garbage 
collection and piped water to 2.4 and 2.5 more people, respectively. 
 
Now recall from Table 5 that about one fifth of the marginal-oil related Real goes to “Housing 
and Urban Development.” Hence, assuming that the kind of house that gets built with oil-related 
revenue is made of approximately five rooms, and that the size of a family is less than four 
people, we can conclude from this bounding exercise that a bundle of (less than) 5 housing units 
and electricity, garbage collection, and water provision for (less than) one family costs at least 
R$200,000.  
 
This figure seems rather large. The marginal cost of extending electricity, garbage collection, and 
water to an extra family should be extremely low, so the bulk of these R$200,000 should be 
accounted for by the extra five housing units.  An official estimate of the cost of a social housing 
unit (casa popular) is approximately $R25,000 in 2003 (cited in Petroleo, Royalties, & Regiao, 
September 2004), equivalent to approximately $R20,200 in 2000. Hence, 5 new housing units 
should cost approximately R$100,000. This seems to suggest that at least some of the R$200,000 
have gone missing. And recall that R$200,000 is a lower bound on the cost of the bundle: the 
bulk of the probability mass places the cost at a much higher level. 
 
The caveats of this exercise are obvious. On the one hand, we have ignored urban and sanitation 
services that were destroyed by oil, even according to the upper-bound coefficient. This implies 
that we are over-stating the benefits of oil-related revenues. Also, we are taking the upper bound 
as the situation in which all 8 coefficients happen to simultaneously take their individual 95% 
upper-bound value. The probability of this happening is, of course, vastly less than 5%. Again, 
this goes in the direction of exaggerating the possible benefits of oil-income. On the other hand, 
there may be other services paid for by the Housing and Urban Development budget that we do 
not observe. Whether this omission leads to an overestimate or underestimate of the benefits of 
oil is ambiguous, as we have seen from Table 5 that oil revenues are as likely to destroy as to 
create new services. 
 
When the same exact procedure is followed using the level regressions (Table 6, Panel C) the 
results are more favorable for the oil rich municipalities. The upper bound on what the 
hypothetical R$200,000 oil-induced increase in the housing budget includes housing for 70 
families, electricity hook-up for 1, garbage collection for about 3, and piped water provision, 
linkage to water network, and linkage to sewerage network to 1. These numbers do not seem 
particularly small, so clearly in the case of the level regressions the bounding exercise is 
inconclusive. 
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For the municipal-road variable in column (9) we only have level regressions. The 95% upper 
bound for the offshore-only, IV coefficient is 0.0031. Given the specification of the regression, 
this means that R$1,000,000 of revenues translate at best into 3m of road. Table 5 implies that 
transportation gets about R$130,000 out of this million. We do not have an independent estimate 
of the marginal cost of building 3m of municipal road but R$130,000 seems like an enormous 
sum. Of course the same caveats as before apply. 
 
Moving on to the education-related variables in columns (1)-(4) of Table 7, the upper bounds 
from the difference regressions are  
 
2.8871 0.7467 6.2981 1.9189 
 
So that $R1 million in 2000 (of which approximately $R140,000 goes to education according to 
Table 5) translates into fewer than 3 teachers and 1 classroom contemporaneously. Allowing for 
a five year lag, however, leads to an upper-bound of 6 teachers and 2 classrooms, which seems 
much more acceptable. In the level regressions the upper bounds are quite similar. On the 
interpretation of the 5-year lagged regressions, however, the caveats in footnote 38 still apply. 
 
For municipal heath establishments the upper bounds in the difference regressions (coupled with 
the coefficients in Table 5) imply that R$100,000 of oil-related revenue spent on health and 
sanitation in 2000 lead at most to 0.02 hospitals and 0.28 clinics. One way to interpret these 
numbers is that R$5M could buy a bundle of one hospital and 4 clinics. This does not seem an 
outrageous price tag so the bounding exercise is again inconclusive. 
 
The upper bound for social transfers Column (7) is negative so clearly the “no effect” result is 
robust. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No oil
Only AMCs 
where oil was 
first 
discovered 
after 1970
All AMCs with 
oil
AMCs with 
offshore oil 
only
AMCs with 
onshore oil 
only
GDP per capita in 2002 (Brazilian R$2000) 4,313 6,288 6,813 8,058 6,305
Municipal revenues per capita in 2000 (Brazilian R$2000) 508 566 539 699 440
Population in 2000 45,116 74,031 90,944 93,372 82,175
Latitude -16.6 -13.5 -12.7 -17.8 -10.6
Longitude 45.0 40.5 39.3 42.1 38.2
Coast dummy 0.04 0.66 0.55 1.00 0.27
Distance to the federal capital (kilometers) 1,016 1,320 1,271 1,180 1,297
State capital dummy 0.006 0.017 0.039 0.032 0.032
Distance to the state capital (kilometers) 245 134 99 99 96
Mean oil output per capita in 2000 (Brazilian R$2000) 0 3,388 2,824 3,894 2,319
90th percentile of oil output per capita in 2000 (Brazilian R$2000) 0 9,193 6,949 6,949 6,737
95th percentile of oil output per capita in 2000 (Brazilian R$2000) 0 17,577 10,249 21,319 9,193
Maximum oil output per capita in 2000 (Brazilian R$2000) 0 45,221 45,221 45,221 15,661
Observations (AMCs) 3,556 59 103 31 63
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Brazilian AMCs
Notes: Each AMC includes one municipality or multiple municipalities. In all tables "Oil" denotes both oil and natural gas. All values reported are means, 
unless otherwise specified. Municipal revenues in 2000 are only available for 3,242 out of a total of 3,659 AMCs.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: GDP per capita Post-1970 All offshore onshore
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 1970) -0.017 -0.019 -0.026 0.011
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.042)
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 1980) -0.005 -0.002 -0.009 0.043
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.063)
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 1996) 0.070 0.105 0.084 0.187
(0.107) (0.109) (0.133) (0.161)
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 2002) 0.554 0.523 0.557 0.458
(0.035) (0.048) (0.026) (0.149)
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 2005) 0.808 0.784 0.863 0.611
(0.044) (0.070) (0.033) (0.214)
AMCs 3,615 3,659 3,587 3,619
Observations 18,075 18,295 17,935 18,095
Notes: Each column reports coefficients from a regression using a panel of AMCs (each AMC includes one 
municipality or more). All panels include all AMCs without oil. Column 1 adds AMCs where oil was first 
discovered after 1970; Column 2 all AMCs with oil; Column 3 those AMCs with offshore oil only; and Column 
4 those AMCs with onshore oil only. We use data for 1970, 1980, 1996, 2002, and 2005. All values are in 
Brazilian R$2000. All regressions control for year dummies interacted with latitude, longitude, coast dummy, 
state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust 
standard errors clustered by AMC are in parentheses.
Table 2. Test of Conditional Random Assignment
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable: GDP Per 
Capita
GDP Per 
Capita in 
Industry
GDP Per 
Capita in 
Non-
Industry
GDP Per 
Capita in 
Industry
GDP Per 
Capita in 
Non-
Industry
GDP Per 
Capita in 
Industry
GDP Per 
Capita in 
Non-
Industry
GDP Per 
Capita in 
Industry
GDP Per 
Capita in 
Non-
Industry
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x - - 0.008 - 0.016 - -0.006 - 0.121
(year = 2000) - - (0.017) - (0.021) - (0.013) - (0.049)
(Oil output per capita in 2001) x - - 0.028 - 0.044 - 0.007 - 0.163
(year = 2001) - - (0.030) - (0.037) - (0.021) - (0.069)
(Oil output per capita in 2002) x 0.403 0.381 0.022 0.356 0.029 0.376 0.014 0.297 0.095
 (year = 2002) (0.033) (0.012) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.008) (0.019) (0.116) (0.046)
(Oil output per capita in 2003) x 0.456 0.434 0.022 0.410 0.028 0.439 0.012 0.324 0.103
(year = 2003) (0.051) (0.042) (0.023) (0.044) (0.024) (0.046) (0.021) (0.135) (0.051)
(Oil output per capita in 2004) x 0.368 0.354 0.014 0.335 0.023 0.354 0.005 0.284 0.101
(year = 2004) (0.033) (0.015) (0.021) (0.032) (0.023) (0.015) (0.021) (0.127) (0.045)
(Oil output per capita in 2005) x 0.452 0.447 0.005 0.423 0.012 0.451 0.000 0.311 0.087
(year = 2005) (0.026) (0.016) (0.015) (0.037) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.144) (0.046)
Observations 14,460 14,460 21,690 14,636 21,954 14,348 21,522 14,476 21,714
Table 3. The Effect of Oil Output Per Capita on GDP Per Capita, by Sector
Notes: Each column reports coefficients from a regression using a panel of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality or multiple municipalities). All panels 
include all AMCs without oil. Columns 1-3 add AMCs where oil was first discovered after 1970; Columns 4-5 all AMCs with oil; Columns 6-7 those AMCs with 
offshore oil only; and Columns 7-8 those AMCs with onshore oil only. Industry includes manufacturing, mineral extraction, civilian construction, and public 
utilities. The calculation of GDP in industry (and total GDP) from oil changed in 2002 - see paper for details. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. All regressions 
control for year dummies interacted with latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, 
and state dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by AMC are in parentheses.
Post-1970 All Offshore Onshore
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total municipality 
revenues per capita 
in 2000
Total municipality 
revenues per capita 
in 2000 (see footnote)
Royalties from oil in 
2000 (only AMCs in 
column 2)
Total municipality 
revenues per capita 
in 1991 (see footnote)
Change in total 
municipality revenues 
per capita from 1991-
2000 (see footnote)
A: Post-1970 0.0297 0.0299 0.0195 0.0017 0.0290
(0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0024) (0.0007) (0.0034)
     Observations (AMCs) 3,208 3,512 3,512 3,594 3,493
B: All 0.0301 0.0330 0.0189 0.0029 0.0311
(0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0031)
     Observations (AMCs) 3,242 3,553 3,553 3,638 3,534
C: Offshore 0.0308 0.0311 0.0181 0.0019 0.0293
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0032)
     Observations (AMCs) 3,183 3,484 3,484 3,567 3,466
D: Onshore 0.0218 0.0365 0.0168 0.0069 0.0343
(0.0066) (0.0074) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0062)
     Observations (AMCs) 3,205 3,514 3,514 3,598 3,495
Notes: Each column reports coefficients on Oil Output per Capita in 2000 from a regression using a cross section of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality 
or multiple municipalities). All samples include all AMCs without oil. Panel A adds AMCs where oil was first discovered after 1970; Panel B all AMCs with oil; 
Panel C those AMCs with offshore oil only; and Panel D those AMCs with onshore oil only. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. Since we only have municipal 
revenues for about 91 percent of the AMCs in 2000, columns (2)-(5) predict 2000 municipal revenues from 2001 municipal revenues using a linear regression to 
complete missing 2000 values. Similarly, in columns (4) and (5) we use 1992 municipal revenues to predict missing 1991 values. All regressions control for 
latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses.
Table 4. Effect of Oil Output Per Capita on Municipality Revenues Per Capita
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education Health Housing Transportation Social Total
and and and urban Transfers
Culture Sanitation development
A: All, OLS 0.271 0.122 0.104 0.065 0.065 0.905
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.021)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553
B: All, IV 0.147 0.094 0.242 0.090 0.045 0.903
(0.022) (0.013) (0.049) (0.027) (0.012) (0.059)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553
C: Offshore, IV 0.131 0.105 0.186 0.132 0.049 0.829
(0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.019) (0.006) (0.029)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484
D: All, OLS 0.271 0.119 0.097 0.045 0.068 0.874
(0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.027)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,423 3,423 3,423 3,423 3,423 3,423
E: All, IV 0.153 0.086 0.238 0.088 0.043 0.908
(0.024) (0.015) (0.053) (0.026) (0.014) (0.066)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,423 3,423 3,423 3,423 3,423 3,423
F: Offshore, IV 0.142 0.106 0.185 0.126 0.049 0.841
(0.017) (0.011) (0.021) (0.019) (0.006) (0.038)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,355 3,355 3,355 3,355 3,355 3,355
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 (Panels A-C) or on its 
change between 1991-2000 from a regression using a cross section of AMCs (each AMC includes one 
municipality or more). All samples include all AMCs without oil. Panels A, B, D, and E add all AMCs with oil; 
Panels C and F only those AMCs with offshore oil. Panels A and D report simple OLS coefficients while 
Panels B, C, D, and E instrument revenues with oil output per capita. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. For 
municipalities that did not report expenditures or revenues in 2000 (1991), we predicted these using 2001 
(1992) values and a linear regression. All regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state 
capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 5. Effect of Municipal Revenues from Oil on Municipal Expenditures
Levels (2000)
Functional expenditures
Changes (1991-2000)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Per capita 
residential 
capital
Rooms at 
home per 
1000 
people 
aged 16-
64
Percent of 
population 
not living in 
favelas
Percent of 
population 
living in 
housing 
with 
electricity
Percent of 
population 
living in 
housing 
with 
garbage 
collection
Percent of 
population 
living in 
housing 
with piped 
water
Percent of 
households 
receiving 
water from 
the main 
network
Percent of 
households 
with toilets 
linked to 
the main 
network
Kilometers 
of paved 
roads under 
municipal 
jurisdiction 
per million 
people in 
2005
A: All, OLS 0.00021 0.154 -0.0003 0.0025 0.0025 0.0026 -0.0021 -0.0032 0.168
(0.00015) (0.032) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.049)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553
B: All, IV -0.00033 0.119 -0.0095 0.0095 0.0103 0.0055 -0.0034 -0.0051 -0.012
(0.00044) (0.116) (0.0034) (0.0052) (0.0037) (0.0060) (0.0136) (0.0087) (0.015)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553
C: Offshore, IV -0.00112 0.225 -0.0142 0.0015 0.0078 -0.0051 -0.0196 -0.0112 -0.022
(0.00059) (0.157) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0108) (0.0089) (0.013)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484
D: All, OLS 0.00043 0.018 -0.0003 0.0016 0.0088 0.0029 0.0047 0.0019
(0.00008) (0.028) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,534 3,534 3,534 3,534 3,534 3,534 3,534 3,534
E: All, IV -0.00066 -0.115 -0.0048 -0.0110 -0.0015 0.0000 -0.0072 -0.0164
(0.00028) (0.082) (0.0013) (0.0062) (0.0090) (0.0040) (0.0081) (0.0054)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,534 3,534 3,534 3,534 3,534 3,534 3,534 3,534
F: Offshore, IV -0.00106 -0.128 -0.0064 0.0004 -0.0055 -0.0016 -0.0153 -0.0214
(0.00054) (0.083) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0040) (0.0021) (0.0050) (0.0045)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 (Panels A-C) or on its 
change between 1991-2000 from a regression using a cross section of AMCs (each AMC includes one 
municipality or more). All samples include all AMCs without oil. Panels A, B, D, and E add all AMCs with oil; 
Panels C and F only those AMCs with offshore oil. Panels A and D report simple OLS coefficients while 
Panels B, C, D, and E instrument revenues with oil output per capita. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. For 
municipalities that did not report expenditures or revenues in 2000 (1991), we predicted these using 2001 
(1992) values and a linear regression. All regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state 
capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.
Levels (2000, except for column 9)
Changes (1991-2000)
Table 6. Effect of Municipal Revenues from Oil on Housing and Infrastructure
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Municipal 
teachers 
per million 
people
Municipal 
classrooms 
per million 
people
Municipal 
teachers per 
million 
people
Municipal 
classrooms 
per million 
people
Municipal 
hospitals per 
million people
Municipal clinics 
per million 
people
Social 
transfers per 
capita
2000 2000 2005 2005 2002 2002 2000
A: All, OLS 4.9 2.9 5.0 3.2 0.050 0.288 -0.008
(0.4) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (0.009) (0.032) (0.008)
Obs. (AMCs) 3550 3550 3553 3553 3553 3553 3553
B: All, IV 1.8 0.3 3.8 1.1 -0.007 -0.033 -0.001
(0.9) (0.5) (0.9) (0.5) (0.017) (0.072) (0.003)
Obs. (AMCs) 3550 3550 3553 3553 3553 3553 3553
C: Offshore, IV 1.6 0.7 4.3 1.5 0.011 -0.034 -0.005
(0.8) (0.5) (0.9) (0.6) (0.005) (0.055) (0.002)
Obs. (AMCs) 3481 3481 3484 3484 3484 3484 3484
1996-2000 1996-2000 1996-2005 1996-2005 1992-2002 1992-2002
D: All, OLS 3.0 1.3 3.4 1.7 0.003 0.147
(0.4) (0.2) (0.5) (0.2) (0.011) (0.030)
Obs. (AMCs) 3445 3445 3446 3446 3534 3534
E: All, IV 0.4 0.3 2.5 1.2 0.027 0.095
(1.1) (0.7) (1.3) (0.9) (0.017) (0.095)
Obs. (AMCs) 3445 3445 3446 3446 3534 3534
F: Offshore, IV 0.4 -0.2 3.2 0.7 0.011 0.166
(1.3) (0.5) (1.6) (0.6) (0.006) (0.062)
Obs. (AMCs) 3377 3377 3378 3378 3466 3466
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 (Panels A-C) or on its change 
between 1991-2000 from a regression using a cross section of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality or more). 
All samples include all AMCs without oil. Panels A, B, D, and E add all AMCs with oil; Panels C and F only those 
AMCs with offshore oil. Panels A and D report simple OLS coefficients while Panels B, C, D, and E instrument 
revenues with oil output per capita. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. For municipalities that did not report 
expenditures or revenues in 2000 (1991), we predicted these using 2001 (1992) values and a linear regression. All 
regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance 
to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. For municipalities that did not 
report health establishments, we assumed that there were no health establishments. We have no data on welfare 
income of households for 1991. 
Table 7. Effect of Municipal Revenues from Oil on Education, Health & Transfers
Levels in:
Changes from:
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Per capita 
household 
income
Per capita 
household 
income: 1st 
(=bottom) 
quintile
Per capita 
household 
income: 2nd 
quintile
Per capita 
household 
income: 3rd 
quintile
Per capita 
household 
income: 4th 
quintile
Per capita 
household 
income: 5th 
quintile Percent poor
A: All, OLS 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.24 0.28 -0.0022
(0.12) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.11) (0.40) (0.0006)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553
B: All, IV 0.35 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.33 0.85 -0.0114
(0.21) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11) (0.20) (0.65) (0.0044)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553
C: Offshore, IV 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.62 -0.0045
(0.27) (0.03) (0.08) (0.13) (0.27) (0.87) (0.0027)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484
D: All, OLS 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.41 -0.0034
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.29) (0.0009)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,444 3,444 3,443 3,443 3,443 3,444 3,444
E: All, IV 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.08 -0.0057
(0.16) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14) (0.66) (0.0027)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,444 3,444 3,443 3,443 3,443 3,444 3,444
F: Offshore, IV 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.19 0.12 -0.0036
(0.23) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.20) (0.83) (0.0031)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,376 3,376 3,375 3,375 3,375 3,376 3,376
Changes (1991-2000)
Table 8. Effect of Municipal Revenues from Oil on Household Income
Notes: Per-capita household income is a measure of average personal income from the household census. 
Per-capita household income in a given quintile is the average income in the population between that quintile 
and the previous one. Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 (Panels A-C) 
or on its change between 1991-2000 from a regression using a cross section of AMCs (each AMC includes 
one municipality or more). All samples include all AMCs without oil. Panels A, B, D, and E add all AMCs with 
oil; Panels C and F only those AMCs with offshore oil. Panels A and D report simple OLS coefficients while 
Panels B, C, D, and E instrument revenues with oil output per capita. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. For 
municipalities that did not report expenditures or revenues in 2000 (1991), we predicted these using 2001 
(1992) values and a linear regression. All regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state 
capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses
Levels (2000)
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(1) (2) (3)
Rooms at home per 1000 
municipal employees
Rooms at home per 1000 
adults who are not 
municipal employees
Rooms at home per 1000 
adults: municipal workers 
minus other adults
Levels (2000)
A: All, OLS 0.07 0.15 -0.07
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,550 3,550 3,550
B: All, IV 0.14 0.11 0.03
(0.22) (0.12) (0.22)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,550 3,550 3,550
C: Offshore, IV 0.52 0.21 0.31
(0.18) (0.16) (0.13)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,481 3,481 3,481
Changes (1991-2000)
D: All, OLS -0.05 0.02 -0.07
(0.09) (0.03) (0.09)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,525 3,525 3,525
E: All, IV 0.41 -0.13 0.53
(0.28) (0.08) (0.30)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,525 3,525 3,525
F: Offshore, IV 0.38 -0.14 0.52
(0.17) (0.08) (0.14)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,457 3,457 3,457
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 (Panels A-C) or on its 
change between 1991-2000 from a regression using a cross section of AMCs (each AMC includes one 
municipality or more). All samples include all AMCs without oil. Panels A, B, D, and E add all AMCs with oil; 
Panels C and F only those AMCs with offshore oil. Panels A and D report simple OLS coefficients while 
Panels B, C, D, and E instrument revenues with oil output per capita. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. For 
municipalities that did not report expenditures or revenues in 2000 (1991), we predicted these using 2001 
(1992) values and a linear regression. All regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state 
capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 9. Effect of Municipal Revenues from Oil on House Size
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Offshore Onshore All Offshore Onshore
Oil output per capita in 2000 8.3 7.3 13.4
(8.7) (10.8) (11.8)
3,659 3,587 3,619
Oil output in 2000 0.122 0.116 0.957
(0.031) (0.029) (0.200)
3,659 3,587 3,619
Oil output per capita in 2000 3.9 4.4 2.5
(7.7) (10.0) (12.3)
3,659 3,587 3,619
Oil output in 2000 0.116 0.101 0.749
(0.033) (0.028) (0.335)
3,659 3,587 3,619
Oil output per capita in 2000 12.9 13.1 13.5
(9.2) (12.0) (12.1)
3,659 3,587 3,619
Oil output in 2000 0.155 0.149 0.849
(0.034) (0.031) (0.212)
3,659 3,587 3,619
indicator for news on alleged corruption possibly related to a mayor 
indicator for federal police operation involving a mayor
Notes: Each cell reports coefficients from a regression using a cross section of AMCs (each AMC includes 
one municipality or more). Coefficients in columns (1)-(3)  [(4)-(6)] are multiplied by 106 [109]. All samples 
include all AMCs without oil. Columns 1 and 4 add all AMCs with oil; Columns 2 and 5 only AMCs with 
offshore oil; and Columns 3 and 6 only AMCs with onshore oil. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. The 
dependent variable in the top panel is an indicator for at least one webpage on Brazil's News Agency 
mentioning embezzlement, the mayor, and the name of at least one of the municipalities in the AMC. The 
search code was: desvio prefeito site:www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias. The dependent variable in the 
second panel is the same, except the keyword we searched for was corruption (corrupção). We then 
searched the text of each news item for mention of the name of each municipality. The search was 
conducted from 1-9 July 2009. The dependent variable in the bottom panel is an indicator for having at least 
one current or former mayor investigated by a federal police operation from 2003-2008. All regressions 
control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to 
the federal capital, and state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 10. Effect of Oil on News About Fraud and on Federal Police Operations
indicator for news on alleged embezzlement possibly related to a mayor 
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Rank (Oil 
Output 
in 2000)
Rank (Per 
Capita Oil 
Output in 
2000) Municipality Event Authority involved Amount involved Source
1 4 Campos dos 
Goytacazes
Mayor removed from office and several associates arrested in a case 
involving fraud in bidding and illegal hiring in the city council.
Federal Police 
Operation "Telhado 
de Vidro"
Up to R$240 
million
O Globo, O Dia 
Online
3 12 Macaé State prosecution took legal action against the mayor between 1988-2004, 
who is accused of misusing public funds and participating in a scheme 
directing biddings for contracts of municipal works.
Prosecution of the 
State of Rio de 
Janerio
Not specified Gazetta 
Mercantil
" " " Re-elected mayor and ex-mayor accused of dishonest administration and 
cheating in bidding of school lunches.
Federal Public 
Prosecution
Cumulative       
R$ 1.5 million
Agencia Brasil 
5 20 Cabo Frio Former mayor and current senior municipal employee exchange allegations 
regarding an investigation by the federal police that targeted the 
municipality (among other municipalities).
Federal Police 
Operation "Joao de 
Barra"
Estimated R$700 
million (over 
many 
municipalities)
Agencia Brasil, 
O Globo, 
Jornal do Brasil
6 10 Coari Mayor and associates arrested in a federal police operation under 
allegations of corruption and criminal organization.  This criminal 
organization was accused of directing bids, overbilling, and faking work to 
appropriate resources allocated by the federal government and Petrobras 
for the exploration of oil and gas. 24 hours later, the headquarters of the 
daily newspaper, Diario do Amazonas, which reportedly covered the case, 
was attacked by gunshots.
Federal Police 
Operation "Vorax"
Allegedly at least 
R$50 million
Agencia Brasil, 
Ultimo 
Sequndo, and 
a blog
" " " Mayor accused by a federal prosecutor of fraudulently obtaining social 
security funds.
Federal Public 
Prosecution
Allegedly at least 
R$1.5 million
Agencia Brasil
8 5 Armação de 
Búzios
Mayor ordered to appear before the state court to explain irregularities in 
accounts.
Court of the State 
of Rio de Janerio
Not specified Amarribo (an 
NGO)
9 3 Carapebus Two former mayors accused of corruption and fraud in bidding and were 
investigated as part of a federal police operation
Federal Police 
Operation 
"Pasárgada"
Not specified O Globo
Table 11. News About Allegations of Corruption and Fraud in Oil-Rich Municipalities
Notes: This table lists journalistic accounts of events involving alleged fraud, corruption, and other illegal activities associated with mayors in municipalities that ranked 
in the top 10 in Brazil in total oil output in 2000.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average years of 
schooling among 
people aged 25 
and over
Fraction illiterate 
among people 
aged 15 and over
Residential capital 
per capita
Percent of 
households with 
electric lighting
Percent of 
households with 
toilets linked to 
main network
Percent of 
households with 
water linked to 
main network
A. Post-1970 0.001 -0.086 -0.016 -0.277 -0.063 -0.083
(0.006) (0.200) (0.015) (0.176) (0.165) (0.125)
Observations (AMCs) 3,615 3,615 3,615 3,615 3,615 3,615
B. All 0.006 -0.218 -0.009 -0.063 -0.069 0.000
(0.008) (0.243) (0.016) (0.245) (0.142) (0.145)
Observations (AMCs) 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
C. Offshore -0.005 0.116 -0.023 -0.350 -0.096 -0.142
(0.005) (0.122) (0.015) (0.181) (0.184) (0.131)
Observations (AMCs) 3,587 3,587 3,587 3,587 3,587 3,587
D. Onshore 0.035 -1.081 0.026 0.640 -0.048 0.428
(0.011) (0.205) (0.016) (0.431) (0.047) (0.258)
Observations (AMCs) 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619
Notes: Coefficients on oil output per capita in 2000 for outcomes measured in 1970 (and all multiplied by 1000). Regressions use a cross-section of AMCs 
(each AMC includes one municipality or more). All sample include all AMCs without oil. Panel A adds AMCs where oil was first discovered after 1970; Panel 
B all AMCs with oil; Panel C those AMCs with offshore oil only; and Panel 5 those AMCs with onshore oil only. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. All 
regressions control for latitude, longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state 
Table A1. Further Tests of Conditional Random Assignment
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent 
variable: 
ln(population)
Dependent 
variable: 
population
Dependent 
variable: 
ln(population)
Dependent 
variable: 
population
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 1970) -0.0000138 -1.123 -0.0000094 -1.880
(0.0000134) (1.963) (0.0000167) (2.541)
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 1980) -0.0000139 -1.498 -0.0000090 -2.506
(0.0000133) (2.291) (0.0000161) (2.901)
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 1991) -0.0000106 -1.516 -0.0000061 -2.396
(0.0000128) (2.477) (0.0000155) (3.150)
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 1996) -0.0000056 -1.381 -0.0000012 -2.196
(0.0000125) (2.498) (0.0000147) (3.185)
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 2000) -0.0000051 -1.418 -0.0000004 -2.240
(0.0000124) (2.605) (0.0000142) (3.323)
(Oil output per capita in 2000) x (year = 2005) -0.0000047 -1.452 0.0000005 -2.250
(0.0000123) (2.751) (0.0000135) (3.522)
Years: 1970, 1980, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2005 X X X X
AMCs 3,659 3,659 3,587 3,587
Observations 21,954 21,954 21,522 21,522
Notes. Each column reports coefficients from a regression using a panel of AMCs (each AMC includes one 
municipality or more). All panels include all AMCs without oil. Columns 1 and 2 add all AMCs with oil; 
Columns 3 and 4 those AMCs with offshore oil only. We use data for 1970, 1980, 1991, 1996, 2002, and 
2005. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. All regressions control for year dummies interacted with latitude, 
longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, 
and state dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by AMC are in parentheses.
Table A2. No Significant Effect of Oil on Population
All AMCs
AMCs with offshore oil (or 
no oil) only
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Federal 
and State 
teachers 
per million 
people
Federal 
and State 
classrooms 
per million 
people
Federal 
and State 
teachers 
per million 
people
Federal 
and State 
classrooms 
per million 
people
Federal and 
State hospitals 
per million 
people
Federal and 
State clinics 
per million 
people
Kilometers of 
paved roads 
under non-
municipal 
jurisdiction per 
million people 
in 2005
Value of 
federal 
contracts 
per capita
2000 2000 2005 2005 2002 2002 2005 2000
A: All, OLS -0.3 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.000 0.001 4.7 0.0241
(0.2) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.001) (0.002) (0.6) (0.0039)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,550 3,550 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553
B: All, IV -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.001 -0.011 0.0 -0.0262
(0.9) (0.4) (0.8) (0.3) (0.006) (0.008) (0.6) (0.0132)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,550 3,550 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553 3,553
C: Offshore, IV -0.4 -0.8 -1.4 -0.6 0.007 -0.008 -0.4 -0.0147
(0.7) (0.3) (0.8) (0.3) (0.003) (0.004) (0.6) (0.0085)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,481 3,481 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484
1996-
2000
1996-
2000
1996-
2005
1996-
2005 1992-2002 1992-2002
D: All, OLS -2.2 -0.7 -1.0 -0.2 -0.004 -0.122
(0.3) (0.1) (0.4) (0.1) (0.003) (0.023)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,445 3,445 3,446 3,446 3,534 3,534
E: All, IV -0.7 -0.3 -1.2 -0.2 -0.002 0.105
(0.9) (0.3) (1.0) (0.4) (0.011) (0.123)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,445 3,445 3,446 3,446 3,534 3,534
F: Offshore, IV 0.3 -0.3 -0.7 0.0 -0.009 -0.100
(0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.004) (0.029)
Obs. (AMCs) 3,377 3,377 3,378 3,378 3,466 3,466
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on municipal revenues per capita in 2000 (Panels A-C) or on its change between 
1991-2000 from a regression using a cross section of AMCs (each AMC includes one municipality or more). All samples 
include all AMCs without oil. Panels A, B, D, and E add all AMCs with oil; Panels C and F only those AMCs with offshore 
oil. Panels A and D report simple OLS coefficients while Panels B, C, D, and E instrument revenues with oil output per 
capita. All values are in Brazilian R$2000. For municipalities that did not report expenditures or revenues in 2000 
(1991), we predicted these using 2001 (1992) values and a linear regression. All regressions control for latitude, 
longitude, coast dummy, state capital dummy, distance to the state capital, distance to the federal capital, and state 
dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. For municipalities that did not report health establishments, we 
assumed that there were no health establishments. We have no data on roads or federal contracts for 1991. 
Table A3. Testing for Crowding Out of State and Federal Investments
Levels in:
Changes from:
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Figure 1. Number of Oilfields Discovered by Decade
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Figure 2 AMCs (from 1970) and Oilfields in Brazil .       
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